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Abstract
The first chapter is a joint paper with my committee member as well as my men-
tor, Dr. Myongjin Kim and Dr. Kerry Tan Loyola from University Maryland. We
study the impact of tacit collusion on price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry. We
find that tacit collusion driven by multimarket contact has a positive effect on prices,
but a negative effect on price dispersion. Our empirical results suggest that airfares
throughout the price distribution increases, yet the price distribution becomes more
compressed since 10th percentile airfares increase by a larger amount than 90th per-
centile airfares. Moreover, we also find that this pricing phenomenon does not exist if
Southwest Airlines is present on the route. Thus, route-level price competition is soft-
ened when the same airlines directly compete more frequently, except when Southwest
Airlines services that route. As such, our empirical analysis provides evidence that the
presence of Southwest Airlines exhibits an anti-collusive effect.
Chapter 2 is a joint work with my mentor, Dr. Myongjin Kim and Dr. Qi Ge
from Vassar College. This paper examines US airline mergers between 1993 and 2018
and studies their impact on the labor market. Our difference-in-differences estimates
indicate a significant reduction in the merging airlines’ long-term wage and fringe ben-
efits following the mergers. The effect is particularly salient among large-scale mergers
involving major airlines and low cost carriers. The results also suggest a negative
short-term employment impact of mergers that varies by occupation types. Our find-
x
ings are consistent with the impact of merger-induced monopsony power discussed in
recent literature and offer important policy implications regarding how to account for
employer monopsony power during mergers and acquisitions.
In the third chapter which is a joint work with my best friends, Brent Norwood and
Sean O’Connor, we identify the cross and inter-state effects of marijuana legalization
on house prices using a national housing data set from the online real estate listing
database Zillow.com. We find positive effects upwards of ten percent in the top half of
the price distribution following successful legalization ballot initiatives, and between
five and fifteen percent across the distribution after the state enacts the ballot initiative
and the first legal sales take place. A spatial difference-in-differences model reveals
that within Colorado and Washington, prices in neighborhoods with new dispensary
openings nearby experience a seven percent price appreciation. To summarize, our
results suggest that there are second order benefits to marijuana legalization.
xi
Chapter 1
Tacit Collusion and Price
Dispersion in the Presence of
Southwest Airlines
1.1 Introduction
The airline industry has been the focus of empirical studies on price discrimination
because two important prerequisites for firms to price discriminate are present in this
market. First, customers have different demand elasticities since demand from business
travelers is less price elastic than that of leisure travelers. Second, airlines are able to
distinguish between these two types with certain ticket restrictions, including advance-
purchase requirements, nonrefundable tickets, and Saturday night stay-overs.
The existing literature contains contrasting research on the effect of competition on
price dispersion. On the one hand, Borenstein and Rose (1994) use cross-sectional data
to find a positive effect of airline competition on price dispersion, whereas Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) use panel data to find that price dispersion decreases with competition.
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More recently, Kim and Shen (2018) reconcile these results by showing that the outcome
hinges on product differentiation and market definition. Using panel data from 1993 to
2013, they find that an increase in competition has a positive effect on price dispersion
for one-way tickets, but a negative effect for round-trip tickets.
Typically, competition is proxied using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or
the number of firms in a market. However, a decrease in market concentration or an in-
crease in the number of firms might not necessarily result in stronger price competition.
One of the market conditions that could facilitate collusion is multimarket contact, in
which rival firms compete head-to-head in a multitude of markets. Indeed, Ciliberto
and Williams (2014) find evidence of tacit collusion in the airline industry since an
increase in average multimarket contact is associated with higher average airfares.
The first main result of this paper is that multimarket contact has a negative
effect on price dispersion. Consistent with Ciliberto and Williams (2014), we find that
airlines with more multimarket contact are more likely to tacitly collude by raising
average prices. We expand on their analysis by showing that price dispersion decreases
since airlines raise their 10th percentile airfares (likely paid by leisure travelers) by a
relatively higher amount than their 90th percentile airfares (likely paid by business
travelers). Our second main result is that the presence of Southwest Airlines mitigates
the effect of multimarket contact such that the evidence for tacit collusion occurs in
markets that are not serviced by Southwest but disappears in markets operated by
Southwest.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we combine
the empirical research on the relationship between price dispersion, competition, and
multimarket contact. We achieve this by constructing new instrumental variables for
average multimarket contact based on outsourcing agreements between major carriers
and regional airlines. Second, we provide evidence that Southwest creates not only a
2
pro-competitive effect on airfares but more interestingly the presence of Southwest also
exhibits an anti-collusive effect in the airline industry. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to document the chilling effect that Southwest has on tacit collusion.
1.2 Literature Review
Feinberg (1984) and Bernheim and Whinston (1990) serve as seminal papers on the
theoretical work on the effect of multimarket contact and price competition. In par-
ticular, Feinberg (1984) discusses the mutual forbearance behavior, in which conglom-
erate firms take each other’s actions into consideration when they compete in multiple
markets together. Firms choose output independently, yet fear indirect retaliation in
another market. In other words, multimarket contact is more likely to induce collusion.
Moreover, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) posits that multimarket contact facilitates
collusion under certain conditions of repeated competition. Although the mutual for-
bearance story is typically associated with conglomerates, the theory can be applied
to multi-product firms, including companies that produce a single product in multiple
geographic markets. They show that a number of factors (e.g. costs, market character-
istics, and discount factor) determine whether prices can rise or fall due to multimarket
contact.
Several empirical papers have applied the theory from Feinberg (1984) and Bern-
heim and Whinston (1990) to the airline industry. Evans and Kessides (1994) finds
that average one-way airfares are higher in city-pair markets served by carriers with
extensive multimarket contact, whereas Zou, Yu, and Dresner (2012) find that airline
alliances mitigate the positive relationship between multimarket contact and airfares
for transpacific routes. Instead, they find that higher airfares exist when airlines have
greater multimarket contact on open-skies routes. Although most applied work exam-
3
ine the effect of multimarket contact on price competition, Prince and Simon (2009)
and Bilotkach (2011) find that multimarket contact can also adversely affect flight de-
lays and flight frequency, respectively. Thus, multimarket contact has been shown to
facilitate softer price competition and lower product quality in the U.S. airline industry.
There have certainly been considerable empirical work on the effect of multimarket
contact on prices in industries other than airlines. For example, Fernandez and Marin
(1998) confirm the theory in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) that multimarket contact
facilitates collusion using data from the Spanish hotel industry. Interestingly, they find
that the omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias
on the effect of concentration on prices. Indeed, prices are higher when there is more
multimarket contact among firms in the U.S. cement industry (Jans and Rosenbaum,
1996), movie theaters (Feinberg, 2014), and hospitals (Schmitt, 2018). Finally, Pilloff




We obtain data from two main sources. Our first main data set is the Airline Origin and
Destination Survey (DB1B) database, which is a 10% random sample of all domestic air
travel and provides information on prices, origin, destination, the number of passengers
per ticket, the number of coupons for an itinerary, distance, and a round-trip indicator.
Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we focus on domestic, coach-class, and nonstop
airline tickets, but we expand the sample time period to 1993:Q1 and 2017:Q4. The
second main data set is from the T-100, which provides data on capacity (the number
of flights and seats), as well as total enplaned passengers. Both of these data sets are
4
made publicly available by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
We identify outsourcing in the DB1B data set when the ticketing carrier is a major
airline, while the operating carrier is a regional airline. Major airlines like American
Airlines or Delta Air Lines outsource the operation of certain routes to various regional
airlines like Air Wisconsin, Chautauqua, Mesa, Republic Airlines, SkyWest Airlines,
and Trans State Airlines. Under these agreements, major airlines are responsible for
ticket sales and airport operations, whereas regional airlines operate the route with
their own aircraft and flight crew.1
1.3.2 Variable Construction
Our variable construction closely follows Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Ciliberto
and Williams (2014). To calculate average fares for ticketing airline i on route j in
year-quarter t (Fareijt), we first treat round-trip tickets as two one-way tickets by
dividing the fare by two and deflating fares using the consumer price index to 2017
dollars.2 As with Ciliberto and Williams (2014), routes are defined as a uni-directional
airport-pair.3 We also drop exceedingly low and high fares (less than $25 and greater
than $2,500). We also calculate the 10th percentile airfare (Fare10ijt) and the 90th
percentile airfare (Fare90ijt). The Gini coefficient (Giniijt) measures price dispersion
and is defined as twice the expected absolute difference between two ticket prices drawn
randomly from the population. As such, a Gini coefficient equal to 0 implies that every
1Forbes and Lederman (2009) and Tan (2018) provide detailed information on the relationship
between major carriers and regional airlines.
2We use data on the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to deflate
prices.
3Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we avoid ”double counting” round-trip tickets by dropping
one of the directions consistently. For example, suppose a passenger flies Southwest Airlines nonstop
between Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) and Boston Logan International Airport
(BOS). We drop the return leg (BOS to BWI) in order to avoid double counting the round trip ticket.
Moreover, our results are qualitatively similar if we instead define a route using city-pair groupings in
Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2014) and are available upon request.
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passenger pays the same price, whereas an increase in the Gini coefficient suggests an







Our key variable of interest is average multimarket contact. We follow Evans and
Kessides (1994) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014) to construct multimarket contact
for a pair of airlines A and B on a route (MMCtAB) and average multimarket contact
on a route (Avg MMCjt). First let MMC
t
AB denote the number of routes that two
distinct carriers, A and B, simultaneously serve at time t. For example, American and
Delta directly competed on 855 routes in the first quarter of 2017 so both MMC2017Q1AADL
= MMC2017Q1DLAA = 855. For each quarter, we construct a matrix of these pair-specific
variables. We then use the MMCt matrix to calculate the route-specific average of








I[A and B active]jt ∗MMCtAB,
where the indicator function, I[A and B active]jt is equal to 1 if carriers A and B are
both on route j at time t, Fjt is the number of incumbent firms on route j at time t,
and F is the total number of airlines so that Fjt(Fjt−1) drops diagonal elements in the
matrix since those indicate multimarket contacts of themselves. Thus, Avg MMCjt is
equal to the average of MMCtAB across the firms actively serving route j at time t. As
such, variation in average multimarket contact across markets comes from differences
in the set of firms operating in the market because the multimarket contact of two
carriers, MMCtAB, is fixed for a specific time period. In other words, the numerical
value for Avg MMCjt varies based on changes in the set of airlines operating in the
market, as well as potential changes in the degree of overlap between a given pair of
carriers.
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We use outsourcing agreements between major carriers and independent regional
airlines to construct two instruments for Avg MMCjt. We first separate routes into 10
markets based on deciles of route-level passenger traffic (i.e. 0-10, 10-20, 20-30,. . ., 90-
100 percentiles of route-level enplanements). Next, we calculate two average outsourc-
ing ratios: 1) an outsourcing ticket ratio for a particular airline (own outsourcingijt)
and 2) an outsourcing ticket ratio for competing firms (competitor outsourcingijt) for
the relevant market size of each route. To be sure, route j is not included in the
construction of the two outsourcing variables in order to avoid the direct correlation
between an airline’s outsourcing decision made for a given market and our dependent
variables (airfares and the Gini coefficient) in that market. For example, suppose
American Airlines flies three airport-pair routes (A-B, C-D, and E-F) in one of the
market groups. We define own outsourcingijt for American Airlines on the A-B route
by taking the average of own outsourcingijt for C-D and E-F routes. Similarly, the
average of own outsourcingijt for A-B and E-F routes are used to calculate the value
of own outsourcingijt for American Airlines servicing the C-D route.
Regional airlines can be either a wholly owned subsidiary of a major airline or
independent from major airlines. Following Tan (2018), we focus our attention on the
partnerships between major airlines and independent regional airlines since including
wholly owned regionals in our analysis can lead to endogeneity issues if a demand
shock can lead to a major both changing its pricing and reallocating flights serviced
by its wholly owned regional airlines.4 Major airlines are responsible for the pricing of
4Since each major airline owns multiple regional airlines, we do not include these wholly owned
subsidiaries in our outsourcing variables. For example, Envoy Air (formerly, American Eagle) and
Executive Airlines have been American Airlines’s wholly owned subsidiaries. PSA and Piedmont
Airlines were wholly owned subsidiaries of US Airways before the American - US Airways merger
in 2015, and subsequently became a wholly owned subsidiary of American. ExpressJet (formerly,
Atlantic Southeast Airlines) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta Air Lines from 1999 to 2005
before being purchased by SkyWest, while Comair was a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta before Delta
shut it down in 2012. Mesaba and Compass Airlines were wholly owned subsidiaries of Northwest
Airlines and then became wholly owned subsidiaries of Delta following the Delta - Northwest merger
in 2010 before being sold to Pinnacle and Trans States Airlines, respectively. Endeavor Air (formerly,
7
flights operated by regional airlines, especially in the case of wholly own subsidiaries,
so major airlines can change their prices for flights operated by their wholly owned
regionals promptly in response to market specific shocks. Thus, we do not include
these wholly owned subsidiaries in defining our outsourcing variables and instead only
use independent regional airline partners.
Although we do not have access to actual outsourcing contracts between major
airlines and their independent regional airline partners, a variety of sources, including
the annual report on Form 10-K offered by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the airlines’ official websites, and news articles, show that these contacts are
long-term agreements usually with initial terms of at least 10 years and grants major
airlines with the option to extend the initial term (Form 10-K, Delta, 2010-12-31).5
According to the DB1B data, outsourcing contracts last for 36.6 quarters on average
during our sample period with the following breakdown by airline: American (36.6
quarters with 9 regional airlines), Alaska (63 quarters with 2 regionals), Continental (30
quarters with 30.2 quarters with 9 regionals), Delta (38.9 quarters with 13 regionals),
Northwest (28.6 quarters with 9 regionals), United (44.5 quarters with 15 regionals),
US Airways (39.7 with 10 regionals). Given the long-term contracts between major
airlines and independent regionals, frequent flight reallocation to endogenize market
specific shocks might be hard so our instruments are less likely to be correlated with
the error term.
We include several additional control variables in our regressions. Carriers serv-
ing a larger number of destinations out of an origin airport can offer more attractive
frequent flyer programs and experience stronger demand so Networksizeijt is the per-
Pinnacle Airlines) emerged from Chapter 11 reorganization as a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta in
2013. Finally, Continental Micronesia was a wholly owned subsidiary of Continental Airlines prior to
the Continental-United merger.
5See Gil, Kim, and Zanarone (2019) and Kim and Kim (2019) for more information on the long-
term agreements between major airlines and independent regional airlines.
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centage of all routes serviced out of an airport by an airline. We construct the variable
Roundtripijt to be the proportion of round-trip tickets sold by an airline for a particu-
lar route in order to control for potential discounting of round-trip vs. one-way travel.
Hubijt is a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one of the endpoint airports
on a route serves as a hub airport for that airline. Finally, HHIjt is the route-level
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is the sum of squared market shares.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Fare 267.375 107.137 41.390 1207.841 242,088
Fare10 129.676 47.344 25.740 807.559 242,088
Fare90 467.263 236.268 44.558 2050.327 242,088
Gini 0.270 0.061 0.000 0.609 242,088
Gini lodd -1.017 0.315 -6.142 0.444 241,637
Avg MMC 232.361 173.331 1.000 1058.000 242,088
own outsourcing 0.148 0.203 0.000 1.000 242,088
competitor outsourcing 0.081 0.142 0.000 1.000 242,088
Networksize 0.472 0.350 0.008 1.000 242,088
Roundtrip 0.727 0.178 0.000 1.000 242,088
Hub 0.649 0.477 0.000 1.000 242,088
HHI 0.620 0.218 0.143 1.000 242,088
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.1. Our final data set contains 242,088
observations for 26 airlines, 4,409 routes, and 100 year-quarter time periods. Detailed
directions of our data construction are outlined in the appendix.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Estimation Strategy
Our empirical analysis combines the estimation strategy in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)
and Ciliberto and Williams (2014). We investigate the effect of multimarket contact
along different points of the price distribution in order to provide insight on the result-
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ing change in price dispersion. The main econometric specification is
yijt = α + βAvg MMC/SDjt + γXijt + ρij + δit + εijt, (1.1)
where yijt is either the Gini coefficient (Giniijt orGini loddijt) or logged airfare (lnFareijt,
lnFare10ijt, or lnFare90ijt) for airline i on route j at time t. Following Ciliberto and
Williams (2014), we proxy for tacit collusion using Avg MMCjt; however, instead of
dividing this variable by 1,000 as in their paper, we instead scale our variable by di-
viding Avg MMCjt by 173, which is the sample standard deviation as reported in
Table 1.1. As such, the key variable of interest in Equation (1.1) is Avg MMC/SDjt.
Xijt includes additional control variables: Networksizeijt, Roundtripijt, Hubijt, and
HHIjt.
6 We include carrier-route fixed effects, ρij, and carrier-time fixed effects, δit.
We cluster standard errors by route to account for serial correlation and correlation
between pricing decisions of carriers on the same route.
Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we include three instruments for HHI in
all of our regressions. The first instrument is lnRoutePassjt, which is logged route-
level passenger traffic in a given time period. The second instrument is iRouteHHIijt,
which is a function of the route-level HHI, as well as observed and fitted values of
an airline’s route-level market shares.7 Finally, our third instrument is PassRatioijt,
which is a ratio based on an airline’s airport-level passenger traffic and the overall
passenger traffic at that airport.8
The effect of Avg MMCjt on airfares is uncertain. On the one hand, an increase in
6As a robustness check, we also include weather-related variables collected from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), such as precipitation, snowfall, and temperature,
as well as capacity-related variables obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, including
peaktime and loadfactor. Our results are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
7Following both Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), iRouteHHI is
calculated as Ŝ2ijt +
HHIjt−S2ijt
(1−Ŝijt)2
∗ (1− Ŝijt)2, where Ŝ2ijt is the fitted value for market share for carrier
i on route j at time t.






, where i is the observed
airline, k indexes all airlines, and Passk1 and Passk2 are quarterly airport-level passenger traffic at
the two endpoint airports.
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the number of rival firms in a market should strengthen competition and lead to lower
airfares. If this holds, then we anticipate a negative value for β in our price regres-
sions. On the other hand, the mutual forbearance hypothesis suggests that average
multimarket contact should facilitate tacit collusion so that weaker price competition
results in higher airfares. If this is true, then the sign for β should be positive.
Ciliberto and Williams (2014) suggest that average multimarket contact is endoge-
nous since time-varying and market-specific unobservables may affect price, entry, and
exit decisions by airlines. Therefore, we construct two instrumental variables: out-
sourcing ticket ratio of an airline (own outsourcingijt) and outsourcing ticket ratio of
competing airlines (competitor outsourcingijt). In order to be a valid instrument, these
outsourcing ticket ratios must be correlated with average multimarket contact and un-
correlated with the error term in Equation (1.1). As such, a major airline’s outsourcing
decision can affect multimarket contact. For example, suppose a route is serviced by
two airlines, Delta (DL) and United (US), that also simultaneously compete head-to-
head on 500 routes (MMCDLUS = MMCUSDL = 500) in a given time period. In this
case, the average multimarket contact on this route, Avg MMC = 2×500
2×1 = 500. Then
suppose that American (AA) enters this route under an outsourcing contract with Sky-
West (OO), an independent regional airline, such that MMCAADL = MMCDLAA =
1000 and MMCAAUS = MMCUSAA = 600, respectively. Thus, AA’s entry increases
average multimarket contact since Avg MMC = 2×500+2×1000+2×600
3×2 = 700. Therefore,
outsourcing can lead to changes in the average multimarket contact.
We expect a positive correlation between average multimarket contact and out-
sourcing as in the numerical example for two reasons. First, there is a higher level of
pair-wise multimarket contact between airlines due to an increase in the set of operat-
ing firms when major airlines expand their outsourcing arrangements with independent
regional airlines. Second, when a major carrier enters a new route but outsources the
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flight operations to an independent regional airline partner, the increase in the degree of
overlap between a given pair of airlines results in an increase in pair-wise multimarket
contact.9
One may argue that outsourcing decisions may not be valid if it is correlated with
a carrier’s entry/exit decisions to endogenize market specific-shocks. However, major
airlines and independent regional airlines are typically engaged in long-term business
relationships as discussed in Section 1.3.2. More importantly, since major airlines are
motivated to outsource in order to exploit the independent regional airlines’ benefit
with respect to cost, economies of scale, and efficient resource allocations from a long-
term point of view, unexpected market-specific shocks to demand or cost would not
affect a major airline’s decision on long-term outsourcing contracts.
Also, it is unlikely that major airlines want to terminate outsourcing contract in
response to market-specific shocks to demand because a single route typically represents
a relatively small portion of a major airline’s revenues out of an airport. For example,
SkyWest operated a variety of different routes for Delta in 2017 which connect around
46 different airports.10 Therefore, shocks in one route may be offset by shocks in another
route, which can neutralize a change in demand out of an airport and consequently
leave outsourcing decisions unchanged. At the same time, independent regional airlines
and major airlines have developed a symbiotic relationship as discussed in Tan (2018)
since independent regional airlines depend on their contracts with major carriers for
passengers, whereas major carriers rely on independent regional airlines as an important
feeder of passengers within their route network. Thus, it appears that major airlines
9It is possible for an independent regional airline to contract with multiple major airlines on a
given route. As a robustness check, we drop these cases and the results are qualitatively similar. See
Kim and Kim (2019) for more details on this special type of partnership and its direct effect on tacit
collusion.
10SkyWest primarily operates Delta-ticketed flights out of Delta’s Atlanta (ATL), Detroit (DTW),
Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP), and Salt Lake City (SLC) hubs. SkyWest’s route map can be found at
https://www.skywest.com/fly-skywest-airlines/skywest-airlines-route-map/.
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will not unilaterally terminate outsourcing contracts with independent regional airlines
unless they are bankrupt.
According to Forbes and Lederman (2009), many contracts between major and
regional airlines allocate the rights to decide on schedule adjustments to the major
airlines. However, having the rights to order specific schedule changes is not equivalent
to having the rights to actually implement those schedule changes. Schedule changes
ordered by the major airlines must still be carried out by the regional airlines. The
same logic seems reasonable to apply towards the rights to changing prices since airlines
consider many aspects in their pricing decisions. Even though major airlines have a
right to adjust prices in real time, they may not want to do so without the cooperation
of regional airlines given the delays and high adaptation costs in the adjustment process
between major and regional airlines.
1.4.2 Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion
We start with the fixed effects (FE) regression results for Equation (1.1). Table 1.2
contains estimation results for all five dependent variables: logged average fare (Col-
umn 1), logged 10th percentile airfares (Column 2), logged 90th percentile airfares
(Column 3), the Gini coefficient (Column 4), and the log-odds ratio of the Gini coeffi-
cient (Column 5). To be sure, there are less observations in the regression results for
Column 5 since there were 447 observations in which Gini = 0 and therefore the value
for Gini lodd for these observations does not exist.
As in Evans and Kessides (1994) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014), we find a
positive and significant coefficient for average multimarket contact (Avg MMC) in
Column 1, suggesting that an increase in average multimarket contact increases average
fares. Thus, we provide corroborating evidence that tacit collusion leads to weaker price
competition in the U.S. airline industry. More importantly, Columns 4 and 5 show that
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Table 1.2: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Networksize 0.018 -0.022* 0.004 0.003 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.003) (0.013)
Roundtrip 0.003 0.009 0.110*** 0.022*** 0.102***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.003) (0.016)
Hub 0.059*** 0.015 0.102*** 0.016*** 0.086***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.014)
ĤHI 0.338*** 0.327*** 0.334*** -0.009*** -0.045***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.003) (0.014)
Observations 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,080
Notes: (i) HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (ii) Carrier-route and carrier-time
fixed effects are included in all regressions. (iii) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (iv) ***
p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
average multimarket contact has a negative and significant impact on price dispersion.
Since 10th percentile airfares (Column 2) increase by more than 90th percentile airfares
(Column 3), the price distribution becomes more compressed.
The results in Table 1.2 might be biased given endogeneity concerns so we report
the regression results of the two-stage least squares fixed effects (FE 2SLS) estima-
tions in Table 1.3 using both outsourcing ticket ratio of an airline (own outsourcing)
and outsourcing ticket ratio of competing airlines (competitor outsourcing) as instru-
mental variables for average multimarket contact. As in Table 1.2, the coefficients for
average multimarket contact in the price regressions (Columns 1-3) remain positive and
statistically significant, whereas the coefficients for Avg MMC in the price dispersion
regressions (Columns 4 and 5) are still negative and statistically significant. Thus, the
regression results in Table 1.3 provide the first main results of the paper, which is that
tacit collusion has a negative effect on price dispersion due to higher 10th percentile
airfares compared to mean airfares and 90th percentile airfares.
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Table 1.3: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion (FE 2SLS - Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.280*** 0.351*** 0.272*** -0.024*** -0.132***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.004) (0.023)
Networksize 0.020 -0.019 0.006 0.002 0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.003) (0.014)
Roundtrip -0.046*** -0.052*** 0.062*** 0.026*** 0.124***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.003) (0.017)
Hub 0.032** -0.019 0.075*** 0.019*** 0.098***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.015)
ĤHI 0.091*** 0.022 0.091** 0.012** 0.066***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.005) (0.025)
Observations 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,080
Notes: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is
instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects are
included in all regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1.
Table 1.4: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion (FE 2SLS - First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Avg MMC/SD Avg MMC/SD Avg MMC/SD Avg MMC/SD Avg MMC/SD Gini
own outsourcing 0.460*** 0.460*** 0.460*** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
competitor outsourcing 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.382***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Networksize 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.003)
Roundtrip 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.186*** 0.026***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.003)
Hub 0.113** 0.113** 0.113** 0.113** 0.109** 0.019***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.003)
ĤHI 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 0.012**





F-stat 97.257 97.257 97.257 97.257 97.136 36.986
Observations 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,080 240,527
Notes: (i) HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (ii) Carrier-route and carrier-time
fixed effects are included in all regressions. (iii) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (iv) ***
p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Columns 1-5 in Table 1.4 shows the first stage regression results for Columns 1-5 in
Table 1.3, respectively. The outsourcing ticket ratio of an airline (own outsourcing)
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has a positive effect on average multimarket contact, meaning that major carriers that
outsource a higher proportion of their own tickets to regional airlines tend to compete
head-to-head more frequently against rival carriers. Similarly, the estimated coefficient
for the outsourcing ticket ratio of competing airlines (competitor outsourcing) is also
positive and significant. Moreover, F-statistics are all greater than 10, implying that
our instruments satisfy the relevance assumption for 2SLS. Lastly, Column 6 shows an
Hausman test result, confirming that average multimarket contact is indeed endogenous
due to correlation with the error term.
As a robustness check, we consider two alternative measures for tacit collusion intro-
duced in Ciliberto and Williams (2014): 1)Avg pct MMCjt and 2)Avg pct weighted MMCjt.
Using the notation for Avg MMCjt in Section 1.3.2, we construct pct MMC
t
AB to be
equal to MMCtAB divided by the total number of markets served by airline A such that
Avg MMCjt factors for the potential risk of smaller airlines having more to lose than
larger airlines by deviating from the collusive agreement.11 Feinberg (1985) weights
multimarket contact by the sales at stake in the markets in which multimarket contact
occur so we define Avg pct weighted MMCtAB as the weighted average of pct MMC
t
AB
based on airline B’s market share, which allows for airlines with the same number of
markets, but varying passenger volumes to benefit differently from the collusive agree-
ment.12
In order to be concise, we truncate the regression results in Table 1.5 by only
presenting the estimated coefficients of the three collusion variables and their standard
error for each of the five dependent variables. As such, the regression results for
Avg MMC/SD are identical to the results presented in Table 1.3. As in Ciliberto and
Williams (2014), our regression results are qualitatively similar for all three measures






B=1,A 6=B I[A and B active]jt ∗ pct MMCtAB .






B=1,A 6=B I[A and B active]jt ∗ pct MMCtAB ∗
MktsharetB .
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Table 1.5: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion (Alternative Measures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.280*** 0.351*** 0.272*** -0.024*** -0.132***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.004) (0.023)
Avg pct MMC 8.088*** 9.541*** 7.522*** -0.701*** -3.749***
(1.579) (1.833) (1.591) (0.167) (0.880)
Avg pct weighted MMC 2.997*** 2.178*** 2.008* -0.268* -1.172*
(0.916) (0.767) (1.043) (0.141) (0.700)
Observations 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,527 240,080
Notes: (i) Each of the three multimarket contact measures is instrumented by own outsourcing and
competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route
and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in
parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
for tacit collusion.
1.4.3 Multimarket Contact and Southwest Airlines
Previous papers have studied the so-called Southwest Effect, in which the presence of
Southwest Airlines puts downward pressure on airfares. Vowles (2001) documents that
rival airlines decrease their airfares when they compete head-to-head with Southwest
Airlines, as well as when Southwest services a nearby airport. Morrison (2001) not only
documents Southwest’s pro-competitive effect on direct and adjacent competition as
in Vowles (2001), but also shows that incumbent airlines lower price due to potential
competition, which occurs when Southwest services both endpoint airports, but not
the direct route itself. Indeed, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) finds strong evidence
of this pro-competitive effect from potential competition with Southwest Airlines and
documents that this pricing phenomenon does not exist on routes where Southwest does
not service either endpoint. More recently, Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) show
that competition against legacy carriers yields weak effects on average airfares, while
the presence of low-cost carriers, particularly Southwest, exhibits strong downward
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pressure on prices. Finally, Tan (2015) find that entry by Southwest Airlines leads to
lower price dispersion since incumbent airlines lower their 90th percentile airfares by
more than their 10th percentile airfares.
We analyze the effect of Southwest Airlines on the pricing phenomenon addressed
in Section 1.4.2 by splitting our data set into two subsamples: one with only routes
served by Southwest and another with routes not served by Southwest. We then
run separate regressions based on Equation (1.1) for each subsample while dropping
observations for Southwest. Table 1.6 breaks down the summary statistics between
the two subsamples. Based on the existing literature, it is unsurprising that the mean
airfare (Fare), 10th percentile airfare (Fare10), and 90th percentile airfare (Fare90)
are all lower, on average, for routes serviced by Southwest than for routes not serviced
by Southwest. In addition, price dispersion (Gini) is also lower for Southwest markets,
which means that the price distribution is more compressed, on average, given the
presence of Southwest Airlines. However, there is a higher incidence of multimarket
contact (Avg MMC), our key variable of interest, on routes serviced by Southwest
Airlines. In Section 1.4.4, we implement a PSM estimation strategy to account for the
possible heterogeneity of market types.
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics for Non-Southwest vs. Southwest Markets
Non-Southwest Markets Southwest Markets
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fare 287.558 109.385 216.715 85.644
Fare10 135.208 47.992 113.341 44.719
Fare90 511.537 246.244 356.456 166.605
Gini 0.279 0.061 0.255 0.049
Gini lodd -0.966 0.309 -1.085 0.261
Avg MMC 1.256 1.010 1.427 0.887
own outsourcing 0.155 0.206 0.186 0.203
competitor outsourcing 0.079 0.142 0.056 0.108
Networksize 0.483 0.364 0.412 0.327
Roundtrip 0.758 0.166 0.672 0.184
Hub 0.685 0.465 0.600 0.490
HHI 0.635 0.217 0.570 0.218
Airport cost1 0.363 0.177 0.166 0.116
Airport cost2 0.363 0.183 0.163 0.118
Observations 177,696 45,002
Figure 1.1: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion for Non-Southwest vs. Southwest
Markets
Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between Avg MMC and Gini for four routes.
The regression results discussed in Section 1.4.2 pertain to the two markets that are
not serviced by Southwest Airlines (top row), whereas the negative correlation between
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multimarket contact and price dispersion no longer holds for the two markets where
Southwest is present (bottom row).13 This novel result motivates the regression analysis
presented in the rest of this section.
Table 1.7: Multimarket Contact and Southwest Airlines (FE 2SLS)
Non-Southwest Markets Southwest Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.192*** 0.253*** 0.184*** -0.019*** -0.101*** 0.044 0.174** 0.040 -0.025 -0.146
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.004) (0.021) (0.055) (0.071) (0.073) (0.017) (0.090)
Networksize 0.009 -0.026 -0.010 0.001 0.010 0.032 -0.021 0.051* 0.009 0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.003) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.007) (0.036)
Roundtrip -0.018 -0.051*** 0.139*** 0.041*** 0.190*** -0.028 0.028 -0.044 -0.017*** -0.081**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.004) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.006) (0.034)
Hub 0.029 0.001 0.078** 0.018*** 0.086*** 0.010 -0.033** 0.047*** 0.015*** 0.085***
(0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.006) (0.026) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.004) (0.021)
ĤHI 0.150*** 0.032 0.166*** 0.021*** 0.110*** 0.245*** 0.145** 0.254*** 0.016 0.094
(0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.006) (0.029) (0.047) (0.063) (0.061) (0.014) (0.074)
lnAirport cost1 0.083*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.004 0.007** 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
lnAirport cost2 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.095*** 0.005*** 0.024*** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 -0.000 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 176,282 176,282 176,282 176,282 175,861 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,357
Note: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is instrumented
by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all
regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Table 1.7 presents separate regression results based on Equation (1.1) for the non-
Southwest markets subsample and the Southwest markets subsample. In addition
to the control variables listed in Section 1.4.1, we include two additional covariates
related to airport costs in order to avoid a possible endogeneity issue associated with
Southwest’s entry decision and demand or supply shocks in the market. For example,
Southwest may choose to enter routes with falling operating costs, and thus incumbents
may cut their prices in response to lower operating costs rather than Southwest’s entry.
Following Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Ma (2019), the airport operating cost
measure for an origin airport (lnAirport cost1ijt) is defined as carrier i’s average logged
13Other popular Southwest routes listed on its official website (https://www.southwest.com/
html/air/routes/index.html?clk=GFOOTER-FLY-ROUTES), such as Atlanta (ATL) to Chicago
(MDW), Las Vegas (LAS) to Denver (DEN), and Oakland (OAK) to Las Vegas (LAS), are asso-
ciated with a similar non-negative correlation between multimarket contact and price dispersion.
These figures are available upon request.
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airfare divided by distance for routes between the origin airport of route j and airports
not serviced by Southwest. Similarly, lnAirport cost2ijt is the airport operating cost
measure for a destination airport and is calculated as carrier i’s average logged airfare
divided by distance for routes between the destination airport of route j and airports
not serviced by Southwest.
The estimated sign for Avg MMC for routes without a Southwest presence is pos-
itive and statistically significant in the three fare regressions (Columns 1-3), whereas
the results for Avg MMC for Southwest markets are generally statistically insignificant
(Columns 6-8). This provides evidence for tacit collusion on routes where Southwest
does not exist; however, the presence of Southwest Airlines precludes this type of col-
lusive behavior. Similar to our key result in Section 1.4.2, Columns 4 and 5 suggest
that price dispersion decreases in non-Southwest markets; however, price dispersion
does not change significantly for markets that include Southwest (Columns 9 and 10).
In other words, the price distribution shifts to the right and becomes more compressed
for routes that Southwest does not service. On the other hand, the price distribution
for Southwest markets weakly shifts to the right with no alteration to its standard
deviation. Thus, Table 1.7 presents the second main result of the paper, which is that
multimarket contact softens route-level price competition except when Southwest is
present on that route.
As a robustness check, we substitute Avg MMC/SD with two alternative measures
for multimarket contact (Avg pct MMC and Avg pct weighted MMC) as with Table
1.5. The results in Table 1.8 are qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table
1.7. By construction, the regression results forAvg MMC/SD are identical in both Ta-
bles 1.7 and 1.8. More importantly, the estimated coefficients for Avg pct MMC and
Avg pct weighted MMC are generally statistically insignificant for Southwest mar-
kets, further suggesting that the presence of Southwest exhibits anti-collusive behavior
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Table 1.8: Multimarket Contact and Southwest Airlines (Alternative Measures)
Non-Southwest Markets Southwest Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.192*** 0.253*** 0.184*** -0.019*** -0.101*** 0.044 0.174** 0.040 -0.025 -0.146
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.004) (0.021) (0.055) (0.071) (0.073) (0.017) (0.090)
Avg pct MMC 5.305*** 6.264*** 4.567*** -0.595*** -3.094*** -1.243 -0.913 -1.041 -0.062 -0.644
(1.068) (1.197) (1.088) (0.137) (0.696) (0.780) (0.804) (1.077) (0.193) (1.008)
Avg weighted pct MMC 3.432*** 3.337*** 2.447** -0.453*** -2.277*** -3.390* -4.103* -2.882 0.140 0.239
(0.884) (0.808) (0.964) (0.134) (0.666) (1.870) (2.168) (2.349) (0.403) (2.078)
Observations 176,282 176,282 176,282 176,282 175,861 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,357
Notes: (i) Each of the three multimarket contact measures is instrumented by own outsourcing and
competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route
and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in
parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
in the airline industry.
1.4.4 Robustness Checks
To mitigate the potential concern that the effect of multimarket contact on the de-
pendent variables between non-Southwest markets and Southwest markets is driven
by the systemic differences between the two subsamples, we constructed a sample of
non-Southwest markets using propensity score matching (PSM) following Ma (2019),
in which we fit a multinomial logistic regression as a function of the set of covariates
that we include in our specifications such as HHI, distance, a dummy variable indi-
cating whether there is a low-cost carrier other than Southwest on a route, as well as
other carrier-route characteristics. Following Cochran and Rubin (1973) and Austin
(2011), we use a Caliper Matching Process with a caliper of width equal to 0.2 of the
standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score.
Table 1.9 presents the regression results using this PSM estimation method.14 Con-
sistent with Table 1.7, airfares for non-Southwest markets increase all along the price
distribution, while price dispersion significantly decreases due to the relatively larger
increase on 10th percentile airfares compared to the 90th percentile airfares. In con-
14Although we report the results using PSM two times, we obtain qualitatively similar estimates
when using PSM either one time or three times. These results are available upon request.
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trast, estimates for Avg MMC/SD across the five regression specifications for South-
west markets are generally insignificant such that there is no change in airfares or the
Gini coefficient. These consistent results imply that our main results in Table 7 nei-
ther suffer from heterogeneous market characteristics nor result from spurious effects.
Therefore, we conclude that Southwest Airlines exhibits an anti-collusive impact on
price competition.
Table 1.9: Multimarket Contact and Southwest Airlines (PSM Estimation)
Non-Southwest Markets Southwest Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.184*** 0.253*** 0.163*** -0.021*** -0.114*** 0.044 0.174** 0.040 -0.025 -0.146
(0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.005) (0.027) (0.055) (0.071) (0.073) (0.017) (0.090)
Networksize -0.001 -0.023 -0.018 -0.000 0.001 0.032 -0.021 0.051* 0.009 0.045
(0.027) (0.025) (0.034) (0.004) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.007) (0.036)
Roundtrip -0.057*** -0.052** 0.027 0.021*** 0.094*** -0.028 0.028 -0.044 -0.017*** -0.081**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.005) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.006) (0.034)
Hub 0.042 0.061 0.065 0.004 0.021 0.010 -0.033** 0.047*** 0.015*** 0.085***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.048) (0.007) (0.032) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.004) (0.021)
ĤHI 0.212*** 0.105*** 0.244*** 0.020*** 0.111*** 0.245*** 0.145** 0.254*** 0.016 0.094
(0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.006) (0.032) (0.047) (0.063) (0.061) (0.014) (0.074)
lnAirport cost1 0.081*** 0.056*** 0.098*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.004 0.007** 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
lnAirport cost2 0.070*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.004*** 0.020*** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 -0.000 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 87,745 87,745 87,745 87,745 87,229 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,383 44,357
Note: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is instrumented
by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all
regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Table 1.10 and Figure 1.2 both provide robustness checks for the results in Table 1.9.
Table 1.10 reports the standardized mean difference, which is the difference in means
divided by the standard deviation. Following Cohen (2013), a standardized mean
difference of less than 0.20 is considered ”small,” 0.40 is considered ”moderate,” and
0.60 is considered ”large.” With no established standards for determining substantial
overlap of propensity scores, we use a combination of balancing (Table 1.10) and overlap
tests (Figure 1.2) to assess whether the groups are similar enough to support causal
inference. Overall, it appears reasonable to consider the covariates’ distributions are
balanced between the two different groups after PSM.
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Table 1.10: Balance Test of Covariates Before and After PSM
Mean in Treated Mean in Untreated Unweighted Weighted
(Southwest Markets) (Non-Southwest Markets) Standardized Diff. Standardized Diff.
Networksize 0.41 0.48 -0.205 0.017
Roundtrip 0.67 0.76 -0.491 0.006
Hub 0.60 0.68 -0.176 0.003
Bankruptcy 0.00 0.01 -0.051 0.002
Legacy 0.77 0.88 -0.289 0.003
Distance 1021.18 979.35 0.067 -0.004
HHI 0.57 0.63 -0.300 -0.015
Figure 1.2: Overlap Test of Propensity Scores Before and After PSM
It is natural to wonder whether our results pertain only to Southwest Airlines.
Indeed, Tan (2015) showed that the Southwest Effect, in which incumbents significantly
reduce airfares as a response to entry by Southwest, can loosely be applied to other low-
cost carriers. Table 1.11 reports the regression results when we separate our original
data set into two subsamples: markets not serviced by other low-cost carriers and
markets serviced by other low-cost carriers.15 To be sure, we exclude all observations
pertaining to Southwest markets so that we can assess whether other low-cost carriers
exhibit a similar anti-collusive effect as discussed in Section 1.4.3. As such, low-cost
carrier markets consist of routes serviced by a low-cost carrier other than Southwest
Airlines. As with our analysis for Southwest markets (Table 1.7), we drop observations
pertaining to low-cost carriers in the regressions for low-cost carrier markets so that we
are able to compare only the same carrier groups (i.e. major airlines) in both markets.
15A list of low-cost carriers can be found in the Data Appendix at the end of the paper.
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Table 1.11: Multimarket Contact and Low-Cost Carriers
Non-Low-Cost Carrier Markets Low-Cost Carrier Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.223*** -0.016** -0.088*** 0.170*** 0.280*** 0.124 -0.037** -0.178**
(0.039) (0.037) (0.048) (0.007) (0.033) (0.065) (0.076) (0.084) (0.016) (0.079)
Networksize 0.005 -0.034* -0.021 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.034 -0.014 -0.008 -0.034
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.003) (0.016) (0.036) (0.026) (0.048) (0.007) (0.034)
Roundtrip -0.088*** -0.141*** 0.150*** 0.067*** 0.317*** 0.028 -0.004 0.090* 0.012* 0.054
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.005) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.046) (0.007) (0.034)
Hub 0.024 -0.023 0.076*** 0.022*** 0.097*** -0.006 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.012
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.006) (0.027) (0.062) (0.044) (0.095) (0.013) (0.064)
ĤHI 0.091** 0.034 0.072* 0.007 0.042 0.282*** 0.141*** 0.374*** 0.038*** 0.178***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.043) (0.006) (0.029) (0.045) (0.043) (0.058) (0.009) (0.045)
lnAirport cost1 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.107*** 0.005*** 0.023*** 0.078*** 0.041*** 0.103*** 0.008*** 0.041***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009)
lnAirport cost2 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.105*** 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.071*** 0.044*** 0.089*** 0.006*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009)
Observations 120,686 120,686 120,686 120,686 120,646 33,919 33,919 33,919 33,919 33,908
Note: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii) HHI is instrumented
by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all
regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Unlike with Tables 1.7 and 1.9, the estimated coefficients for Avg MMC/SD in
the price regressions presented in Table 1.11 are positive and significant for both non-
low-cost carrier markets (Columns 1-3) and low-cost carrier markets (Columns 6-8). In
particular, there is evidence of tacit collusion in other low-cost carrier markets among
major airlines, especially on 10th percentile airfares (Column 7), which makes sense
given that low-cost carriers’ markets are relatively small and more likely serve leisure
travelers with lower prices. Moreover, price dispersion significantly decreases in both
non-low-cost carrier markets (Columns 4 and 5) and low-cost carrier markets (Columns
9 and 10). Thus, the regression results suggest that there is something special about
the presence of Southwest Airlines that precludes tacit collusion. When we turn our
attention from Southwest markets to other low-cost carriers’ markets, the anti-collusive
behavior disappears. Thus, the regression results suggest that Southwest Airlines plays
a unique role by exhibiting not only a pro-competitive effect already established in the
existing literature but also an anti-collusive effect in the U.S. airline industry.
Although other low-cost carriers like JetBlue or Frontier benefit from low marginal
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costs like Southwest, Table 1.11 shows that other low-cost carriers do not have the same
effect as Southwest on tacit collusion. According to Kang, Bayus, and Balasubramanian
(2010), relative firm size can affect a firm’s strategy when faced with high levels of
multimarket contact. They find that dominant firms ignore rivals with relatively small
market shares and tacitly collude with other dominant firms in markets with intense
multimarket contact. According to our sample, Southwest’s market share is similar to
the market share for major airlines with an average difference of 0.09%. However, other
low-cost carriers have a significantly lower market share (19.6%) than major airlines.
As such, major airlines still tacitly collude with each other when low-cost carriers other
than Southwest are present. Therefore, Southwest is unique compared to other low-
cost carriers because of Southwest’s similar relative firm size with major airlines along
with their lower marginal cost.16
Although we believe that our instruments are valid, we lag them in order to mitigate
concerns about the possible correlation of our instruments with contemporaneous de-
mand shocks. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 provide a robustness check for Table 1.3 in Section
1.4.2 and Table 1.7 in Section 1.4.3, respectively. However, we replace our instruments
for Avg MMCjt with a four quarter lag of airline i’s own outsourcing ticket ratio on
route j (own outsourcingij,t−4) and a four quarter lag of the outsourcing ticket ratio
for airline i’s competitors servicing route j (competitor outsourcingij,t−4).
As with Table 1.3, the estimated coefficients for Avg MMC/SD in the airfare
regressions (Columns 1-3) are positive and significant, whereas these coefficients are
negative and significant in the price dispersion regressions (Columns 4-5). Moreover,
our results in Table 1.13 are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 1.7 in Section
1.4.3. In other words, there is evidence of tacit collusion softening price competition in
non-Southwest markets (Columns 1-5); however, the presence of Southwest appears to
16Demand and marginal cost analysis showing Southwest marginal cost is the lowest compared to
major airlines are available in the online appendix.
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Table 1.12: Multimarket Contact and Price Dispersion (One Year Lag IVs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.326*** 0.485*** 0.275*** -0.051*** -0.286***
(0.072) (0.087) (0.081) (0.012) (0.065)
Networksize 0.030 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 -0.004
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.004) (0.019)
Roundtrip -0.056** -0.077*** 0.056** 0.031*** 0.145***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.004) (0.023)
Hub 0.056** 0.027 0.085*** 0.010** 0.056**
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.004) (0.023)
ĤHI 0.065 -0.088 0.108 0.037*** 0.210***
(0.069) (0.083) (0.078) (0.012) (0.063)
Observations 203,634 203,634 203,634 203,634 203,455
Notes: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by one year lags of own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii)
HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects
are included in all regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1.
Table 1.13: Multimarket Contact and Southwest Airlines (One Year Lag IVs)
Non-Southwest Markets Southwest Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd lnFare lnFare10 lnFare90 Gini Gini lodd
Avg MMC/SD 0.172*** 0.315*** 0.141** -0.037*** -0.210*** 0.076 0.052 0.083 0.006 0.008
(0.051) (0.058) (0.063) (0.011) (0.054) (0.064) (0.073) (0.083) (0.018) (0.095)
Networksize 0.020 -0.014 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.035 -0.020 0.052 0.009 0.046
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.004) (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.008) (0.039)
Roundtrip -0.013 -0.065*** 0.147*** 0.045*** 0.212*** -0.025 0.043 -0.042 -0.019*** -0.101***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.005) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.041) (0.007) (0.035)
Hub 0.054 0.086* 0.073 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.023 0.012 0.008* 0.043*
(0.039) (0.045) (0.049) (0.007) (0.035) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.004) (0.022)
ĤHI 0.185*** -0.039 0.231*** 0.044*** 0.241*** 0.223*** 0.250*** 0.227*** -0.008 -0.022
(0.061) (0.071) (0.076) (0.013) (0.066) (0.054) (0.063) (0.069) (0.014) (0.078)
lnAirport cost1 0.083*** 0.048*** 0.099*** 0.006*** 0.032*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
lnAirport cost2 0.080*** 0.048*** 0.094*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.006 0.004 0.007* 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 149,477 149,477 149,477 149,477 149,309 38,882 38,882 38,882 38,882 38,872
Note: (i) Avg MMC/SD is instrumented by one year lags of own outsourcing and competitor outsourcing. (ii)
HHI is instrumented by lnRoutePass, iRouteHHI, and PassRatio. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects
are included in all regressions. (iv) Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1.
preclude this type of behavior (Columns 6-10). Thus, our two key results are robust
to a one-year lag in our instruments.
27
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how tacit collusion in the U.S. airline industry affects price disper-
sion for airfares. Our results imply that average multimarket contact increases average
fare, 10th percentile airfares, and 90th percentile airfares such that tacit collusion has
a negative effect on price dispersion. Given that the mutual forbearance hypothesis
implies that multimarket contact softens competition, our results suggest that airlines
are tacitly colluding by raising their fares all along the price distribution, on average,
when they directly compete more frequently across all routes, but the distribution be-
comes more compressed since prices on the left tail increase by more than prices on
the right tail.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document the role that Southwest
Airlines has on limiting the prevalence of tacit collusion. Our results show that multi-
market contact leads to softer price competition on routes where Southwest does not
exist. More importantly, the presence of Southwest Airlines on a route results in an
insignificant impact of multimarket contact on price dispersion and thus no empirical
evidence of tacit collusion. The upshot is that Southwest Airlines remarkably inhibits
the potential for collusive behavior in the airline industry.
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Appendix: Data Construction
In this appendix, we discuss our methods to construct the sample from DB1B and T-100
Domestic Segment databases. We closely follow the approaches in Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014). To construct our panel data of airline-route-
time ticket observations, we use only domestic, coach-class and tickets containing direct
fights from 1993 to 2017. Here, direct flights encompasses both nonstop flights and
flights in which there is a stop but no change of plane. The BTS includes a variable,
DollarCred, that describes the reliability of each ticket price. Dollar credit is zero
if the ticket fare is of questionable magnitude, and one if it is credible. We drop all
tickets for which DollarCred is equal to zero.
We drop all fares less than $25 for one-way tickets and $50 for round-trip tickets.
Also, we drop exceedingly high fares greater than $2500 for one-way tickets, which are
likely key punch errors. Fares are then deflated using the consumer price index to 2017
dollars from the Bureau of Labor Statistic. The DB1B also provides information on
the fare class of each ticket (coach-class, business-class, or first-class) so we drop all
business-class and first-class tickets.
We also drop tickets if the ticketing and operating carriers are different due to code-
sharing arrangements among major airlines but not due to outsourcing subcontract
between major and regional airlines. Code-sharing occurs when a ticket is sold by a
major airline and the flight is operated by a rival major airline, whereas outsourcing
occurs when a ticket is sold by a major airline and the flight is operated by a regional
airline.
Next, we drop tickets in which the ticketing carrier or operating carrier are not
reported. Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014),
we drop airline-route observations that do not have at least 100 passengers in DB1B
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in order to not only eliminate possible coding errors but also have adequate coverage
to calculate reliable price dispersion statistics. We treat round-trip tickets as two one-
way tickets, and divide the round-trip fare by two, and drop one of two observations
to avoid double-counting.
There is an average of 1.66 ticketing carriers per route, where the minimum is 1
and the maximum is 7 of ticketing carriers. Since major airlines determine the prices
for flights operated by regional airlines and airfares are calculated by ticketing airline,
regional airlines are not counted as separate competitors and their capacity is merged
with that of the major carriers for the purpose of market share computation.
Each airline appears on average for 48.89 quarters (around 12 years). Based on
our category of majors and low-cost carriers, major carriers appear on average for
83.88 quarters (around 21 years) and low-cost carriers appear on average for 33.3
quarters (around 8 years). The shorter time span for low-cost carriers is due to the
a high incidence of entry and exit. Lastly, we drop monopoly markets since average
multimarket contact is undefined for monopoly markets.
Our final unbalanced panel sample contains 242,088 carrier-route-time observations
spanning 26 airlines, 4,409 distinct routes, and 100 quarters between 1993:Q1 and
2017:Q4.17 There have been a decreasing time trend in the number of carriers over
the 25 years in our sample with an average of around 13 ticketing carriers operating
per year-quarter (the minimum and maximum are 8 in recent years and 19 in the late
1990s). In our sample, the number of routes in our sample is larger than the 2,902
routes in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) because of entry and exit that occurred in the
differing time range. However the number of routes in our sample is smaller than the
17Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), our sample includes 26 airlines. The 8 major carriers are
American (AA), Alaska (AS), Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Northwest (NW), Trans World (TW),
United (UA), and US Airways (US). The 18 low-cost carriers are JetBlue (B6), Frontier (F9), AirTran
(FL), ValuJet (J7), Morris Air (KN), Kiwi (KP), National (N7), Vanguard (NJ), Spirit (NK), Pro
Air (P9), Reno (QQ), Sun Country (SY), American Trans Air (TZ), Western Pacific (W7), Eastwind
(W9), Southwest (WN), Air South (WV), and Access Air (ZA).
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6,366 routes in Ciliberto and Williams (2014) since we drop ticketing airline-route-time
observations that do not have at least 100 passengers as discussed above.
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Appendix: Demand and Marginal Cost Analysis
In this online appendix, we investigate why tacit collusion is unlikely to occur in South-
west markets by estimating a demand equation using OLS and 2SLS as in Gayle (2013).
Market miles flown and the interaction between jet fuel price and market miles flown
are used as instruments for airfare since the price of a product (e.g. a flight) is typ-
ically influenced by changes in its marginal cost. Table 1.A1 presents the regression
results for the demand estimations. As expected, the coefficient estimate on lnFare
is negative, implying that higher prices are associated with lower levels of utility. In
other words, passengers prefer cheaper air travel products, all else equal.
















Notes: (i) The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is used for under-identification test while the Hansen’s J statistic is
used for over-identification test. (ii) lnFare is instrumented by market miles flown and the interaction between jet fuel
price and market miles flown. (iii) Carrier-route and carrier-time fixed effects are included in all regressions. (iv)
Route-specific clustered standard errors in parentheses. (v) *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Following Gayle (2013), we then impute the average marginal costs for eight airlines
(listed in alphabetical order by IATA code). Table 1.A2 reports that Southwest has
the lowest average marginal cost compared to major airlines. This is consistent with
36
the calculations in the existing literature; for example, Gayle (2013) estimates that
Southwest’s average marginal cost is $117.95. Since Scherer (1980) explains that a
collusive agreement is more likely to break down if the participating firms have different
marginal costs, it makes sense that tacit collusion could occur in non-Southwest markets
since the major airlines have similar average marginal costs. However, it would be
difficult to maintain tacit collusion in Southwest markets given the stark contrast in
Southwest’s marginal cost compared to the major airlines.
Table 1.A2: Average Marginal Costs
Carrier Code MC ($)
American Airlines AA 218.698
Continental Airlines CO 250.434
Delta Air Lines DL 209.179
Northwest Airlines NW 240.825
Trans World Airlines TW 213.644
US Airways US 215.254
United Airlines UA 227.558
Southwest Airlines WN 137.179
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Chapter 2
Mergers and Labor Market
Outcomes in the US Airline
Industry
2.1 Introduction
Thousands of merger and acquisition transactions take place in the U.S. each year, af-
fecting millions of involved workers’ labor market outcomes. Since protecting consumer
welfare is at the core of antitrust policies and regulations, researchers and antitrust au-
thorities have long been interested in examining the competitive effects of mergers
in consumer product markets, with existing literature addressing both pricing (e.g.,
Prager and Hannan 1998; Weinberg 2008; Hunter et al. 2008; Ashenfelter et al. 2013;
Miller and Weinberg 2017, among others) and quality dimensions (e.g., Sheen 2014;
Prince and Simon 2017; Chen and Gayle 2019; Rupp and Tan 2019, among others).
However, despite its direct policy relevance and importance, the labor market impact
of mergers and acquisitions has received considerably less albeit revived attention.
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A priori, the theoretical prediction of how mergers affect employees’ wage and em-
ployment outcomes is inherently ambiguous. On the one hand, according to Naidu
et al. (2018), mergers can lead to concentration in both the product and labor mar-
kets, giving merged firms monopoly power in the product market and monopsony power
in the labor market. By exercising their monoposony power, employers can thus hold
wage below workers’ marginal revenue product and reduce employment as an effort to
reduce labor cost (Naidu et al., 2018). On the other hand, the presence of labor unions
can strengthen employees’ bargaining power and in turn dampen the monopsony im-
pact of mergers as well as employers’ ability to lower wages and reduce employment
(Benmelech et al., 2018). Indeed, existing literature generally finds mixed evidence
regarding how mergers affect wage and employment based on cross-industry analyses
(Brown and Medoff 1988; Conyon et al. 2001; Conyon et al. 2004; He and le Maire 2019;
Arnold 2019), or case studies on specific sectors and industries, such as manufacturing
(Peoples 1989; McGuckin and Nguyen 2001; Siegel and Simons 2010), healthcare (Cur-
rie et al. 2005; Prager and Schmitt 2019), and railroad (Davis and Wilson 1999; Davis
and Wilson 2003). Our study contributes to these ongoing discussions by examining
the wage and employment impact of mergers in the airline industry featuring unique
institutional background that may further shed light on the topic.
Utilizing airline wage and employment information from Form 41 Air Carrier Fi-
nancial Reports and Schedules P-1, P-6, and P-12 from the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS), we consider horizontal airline merger episodes between 1993 and 2018
and examine both short-term and long-term impact of mergers on the merging airlines’
overall wage and employment outcomes. The US airline industry presents a unique op-
portunity to study the labor market impact of mergers because 1) the industry has wit-
nessed numerous merger episodes since the deregulation era, involving legacy airlines,
low cost carriers (LCCs) and regional carriers; 2) the airline industry has the highest
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union presence among all private sector industries with substantial collective bargain-
ing power to influence employees’ compensation and welfare (Hirsch, 2007); and 3)
airline mergers are typically accompanied by a contentious workforce seniority integra-
tion process that can directly affect the wage and employment outcomes of the involved
employees.1 On the other hand, studying the labor market impact of airline mergers
faces an identification challenge due to potentially endogenous merger decisions, e.g.,
during bankruptcy buyouts, cost considerations can affect both merger target choices
and employment outcomes. To this end, we adopt a difference-in-differences framework
similar to Ashenfelter et al. (2013), Prince and Simon (2017) and Chen and Gayle
(2019) by comparing merging airlines with the uninvolved non-merging airlines before
and after the merger announcements. To further alleviate the endogeneity concerns, we
also validate our findings by re-estimating the specifications with a subsample of non-
bankrupt airlines and by applying inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW)
with propensity scores.
Overall, our results point to a consistently negative labor market impact of airline
mergers in the U.S. Specifically, we find an approximately 5% significant reduction in
the merging airlines’ per capita salaries and fringe benefits in the three to five years
following the merger announcements. The negative wage impact is larger among large-
scale mergers involving major airlines and low cost carriers. Our estimates also indicate
a negative short-term (i.e., within the first two years of the merger announcements)
employment impact of mergers that varies with occupation types.2 Our results are
robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including the implementation of the IPTW
1Seniority integration involves integrating unionized workers from both airlines into a single work-
force. While all mergers need to resolve the workforce integration issue, regardless of their industries,
the integration issue is particularly acute in the airline industry and often requires independent arbi-
tration when the merging airlines rank employees by seniority (Lee and Singer, 2014).
2The occupation types that we consider include pilots, flight attendants, mechanics and mainte-
nance crew, traffic and passenger/cargo handling units, managerial staff, and other miscellaneous staff
members. Due to data limitations, we are unable to analyze the wage impact by airline occupation
types.
40
method and the inclusion of additional controls for airlines’ unionization levels and
financial leverage as well as subsample analyses focusing on non-bankrupt airlines.
Our findings are consistent with merger-induced monopsony power discussed in re-
cent studies such as Benmelech et al. (2018), Naidu et al. (2018) and Marinescu and
Hovenkamp (2019). The within-airline seniority ranks impose significant switching
costs to airline employees (Hirsch, 2007) and can in turn hinder cross-airline mobility
(Fox 2010; Ransom 2019). Such barriers to mobility can effectively further reduce
the elasticity of labor supply, strengthen the monopsony power, and impose downward
wage pressure according to the monopsony model in Card et al. (2018). On the other
hand, the monopsony impact of mergers in the airline industry is also complicated by
its high union presence because unionization reduces the employer’s ability to lower
wages by improving employees’ bargaining power (Benmelech et al., 2018). Our results
regarding the long-run wage suppression therefore imply that while the seniority inte-
gration process can retard the efficient integration of the merging airlines, it may in
fact reinforce the integrated airlines’ monopsony power over time even in the presence
of industry-wide high level of unionization.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge,
this paper is the first to study the impact of mergers on the labor market outcomes in
the airline industry. Previous retrospective merger studies in the airline industry tend
to focus exclusively on product market competition, e.g., Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010)
and Luo (2014) on price competition; Prince and Simon (2017) and Chen and Gayle
(2019) on quality competition; and Rupp and Tan (2019) on de-hubbing effects. Such
focus presents an unfortunate void given the industry’s unique institutional features,
such as its high union presence and the integration of workforce seniority ranks during
mergers, that may lead to competing channels affecting the post-merger monopsony
power and labor market outcomes. Our paper seeks to fill this gap and contribute
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additional empirical evidence toward the growing discussions regarding the monopsony
impact of mergers (Naidu et al. 2018; Marinescu and Hovenkamp 2019; Arnold 2019).
Secondly, standard monopsony models do not offer predictions regarding the short-
run versus long-run labor market impact of mergers. While related studies mostly focus
on the short-run impact, our paper investigates both short-term and long-term impact
of mergers on labor market outcomes. Similar to the reasoning offered by merger studies
focusing on product markets (e.g., Focarelli and Panetta 2003; Prince and Simon 2017),
the impact of mergers on the labor market can also be time-varying because merged
firms could struggle with the integration process in the short-run and may only begin
to achieve efficiency gains and exercise monopsony power in the longer-run. Indeed,
our results document a short-term downsizing in labor force with a long-term wage
suppression following airline merger episodes.
Lastly, our paper exploits airline-level data from the BTS and adds to the limited
discussions regarding the airline labor market, where existing studies tend to utilize
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) or the Census (e.g., Card and Saunders
1998; Hirsch and Macpherson 2000; Hirsch 2007;). While such data sources offer rich
accounts of individual attributes of airline employees, they do not allow differentiation
across carriers as well as matching with airline merger episodes (see Hirsch (2007) for a
discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of airline-level vs. individual-level data).
Additionally, with the exception of theoretical studies (e.g., Lee and Singer 2014), the
impact of workforce seniority integration processes has not been examined. Although
our data do not allow for a direct analysis, our empirical results imply that the seniority
integration process may help reinforce merged airlines’ monopsony power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the insti-
tutional background and conceptual framework for our study. Section 3 describes the
data and empirical strategy in our study. Section 4 presents our main findings and
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performs robustness checks, followed by discussion and concluding remarks in Section
5.
2.2 Background and Conceptual Framework
Labor markets mirror product markets in that concentration can give rise to market
power (Naidu et al., 2018). Specifically, concentration in the labor market could give
employers monopsony power over employees’ wage and employment outcomes. Since
its deregulation in 1978, the U.S. airline industry has witnessed over two dozen merger
cases. It has been well documented that these merger episodes led to concentration
and market power in the consumer product market (e.g., Prince and Simon 2017;
Chen and Gayle 2019), which is typically defined as either airport or city pairs in
the relevant literature. In the labor market context, Arnold (2019) utilizes matched
employer-employee data across different industries and documents variations in local
labor market concentration following mergers and acquisitions. Specific to the airline
industry, while its labor market is arguably less well defined and typically lacks sup-
porting administrative level data,3 we would still expect an overall increase in airlines’
monopsony power as the total number of airlines falls following merger episodes. A
standard monopsony model would then predict a lower wage rate coupled with a lower
level of employment in the integrated firm. Such prediction on the labor market im-
pact of mergers has been (partially) supported by a number of recent retrospective
merger studies across different industries (e.g., Currie et al. 2005; Siegel and Simons
2010; Prager and Schmitt 2019; Arnold 2019). Additionally, similar to Arnold (2019),
we also hypothesize a larger impact from mergers with larger scale, e.g., legacy airline
3Compared to the healthcare industry, labor market in the airline industry is far less geographically
defined. For instance, pilots are generally assigned to their aircraft, flight schedules and bases through
an unpredictable bidding process.
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mergers are expected to see a larger wage and employment impact compared to mergers
involving regional affiliates.
Two unique institutional features in the airline industry can lead to competing
channels that may complicate the post-merger monopsony power and labor market
outcomes. First, the airline industry features the highest union representation among
all private sectors in the U.S. (Hirsch, 2007). By strengthening employees’ bargaining
power, unionization can dampen the monopsony impact of mergers and reduce the
employer’s ability to lower wages. Such prediction is consistent with findings in Benm-
elech et al. (2018) that demonstrate a more pronounced negative relationship between
labor market concentration and wages when unionization rate is low.
Secondly, employment in the airline industry is also characterized by a highly hierar-
chical within-firm and by-position seniority ranking system.4 Despite the high within-
industry transferability of skills, such seniority ranking system essentially increases
employees’ switching costs and in turn limits cross-airline mobility of employees in the
airline industry (Hirsch 2007; Fox 2010; Ransom 2019).5 While the antitrust authorities
focus on market power and consumer welfare when reviewing firms’ merger proposals,
the success of the eventual efficient integration of the merging airlines also relies on the
full seniority integration of the respective heavily unionized labor forces. The seniority
integration process involves combining the merging airlines’ seniority ranks for each
position and has direct impact on employees’ current and future compensations and
benefits in the merged airline. While the recently enacted McCaskill-Bond Amendment
required airlines to integrate the seniority lists in a “fair and equitable” manner (Lee
and Singer, 2014), there are no legal or practical guidelines on how to integrate relative
4When switching employers, an airline employee would typically need to given up the current rank
and restart the seniority clock at the new employer.
5Note that this does not necessarily imply an infinite switching cost or perfectly inelastic labor
supply. For instance, switching costs tend to increase with job seniority, which implies that lowly
ranked entry-level employees would typically face much lower switching costs.
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ranks of employees in the same occupation across two merging airlines. It comes as
no surprise that despite approvals from the antitrust authorities, many past airline
mergers in the U.S. needed to resort to binding and independent arbitration to resolve
seniority integration issues and the resulting labor strife (Lee and Singer, 2014).
An important implication of the airline industry’s seniority-ranked labor force and
the resulting complications when integrating the ranks across merging airlines is that
by combining two already inelastic labor forces into a single seniority rank system,
the merger may further raise switching frictions (e.g., there are even fewer outside
options as a result of the merger) and depress the elasticity of labor supply. Card et al.
(2018) theorize a monopsony model in which a monopsonist sets wage premiums that
are highly correlated across skill groups but inversely related to the elasticity of labor
supply to the firm. Consistent with this model, we therefore expect that the employer’s
merger-induced monopsony power would be strengthened through the integration of
the seniority rank and there would correspondingly be a stronger overall downward
pressure on both wage and employment levels.
Overall, given the unique institutional features of the airline industry, the strength
of post-merger monopsony power would depend on whether the unionization effect or
the impact of the seniority integration process dominates. If it is the latter, we would
expect airline mergers to result in lower wage rates and more workforce downsizing. In
addition, while standard monopsony models do not necessarily differentiate between
short-run and long-run labor market impact, the product market impact of mergers can
vary over time because merged firms could still struggle with the integration process in
the short-run and may only begin to achieve efficiency gains in the longer-run (Focarelli
and Panetta 2003; Prince and Simon 2017). We would thus hypothesize a similar time-
varying impact of mergers in the labor market. Our empirical investigation will take
into account short-term versus long-term labor market impact of airline mergers as
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well as potential heterogeneity across different occupation groups.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data Sources and Description
Our study focuses on 13 horizontal airline mergers between 1993 and 2018.6 Unlike
many retrospective merger studies in the airline industry, the merger cases we consider
involve legacy airlines, low cost carriers and regional airlines, i.e., our sample is not
limited to mergers between legacy airlines as typically considered in related literature.
We construct our merger incident timelines based on extensive searches from air car-
riers’ official websites as well as a number of major news article databases.7 We also
distinguish mergers that involved airlines that declared bankruptcy prior to the merger
incidents. Table 2.1 details the list of involved airlines and the respective merger an-
nouncement dates. The full integration date entails that the merging airlines have
fully integrated their ticketing systems and joint itineraries with a single operating cer-
tificate from the FAA, which previous airline merger studies such as Chen and Gayle
(2019) consider as the official completion of the merger. We, on the other hand, choose
to rely on the merger announcement date to identify the post-merger labor market
impact because it typically takes years for airlines to fully integrate and the merging
airlines’ wage and employment decisions may have already been drafted at the time of
the official merger announcement.8
6We only consider merger episodes where the merging airlines were full integrated within the
sample period. More recent mergers such as Republic (YX)-Shuttle America (S5) and Alaska (AS)-
Virgin America (VX) mergers in 2016 are not included in our study since their full integration extends
beyond our sample period.
7The news databases include archive.org, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA
Today, etc.
8Another constraint with relying on full integration date to identify merger impact is that the date
may be less reliably documented in public data sources, particularly for mergers involving regional
affiliates.
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American-Reno AA-QQ X 11/19/1998 8/30/1999
American-Trans World AA-TW TW:1/10/2001 1/10/2001 12/1/2001
US Airways-America West US-HP US:9/12/2004 5/19/2005 9/25/2007
Delta-Northwest DL-NW X 4/14/2008 1/31/2010
United-Continental UA-CO X 5/3/2010 11/3/2011
American-US Airways AA-US AA:11/29/2011 2/14/2013 10/17/2015
LCCs
Southwest-Morris WN-KN X 12/13/1993 10/4/1994
AirTran-Valujet FL-J7 ∆ J7 7/11/1997 11/17/1997
Southwest-ATA WN-TZ TZ:4/2/2008 11/19/2008 -
Southwest-AirTran WN-FL X 9/27/2010 3/1/2012
Regionals
Republic-Midwest YX-YX (1) ∆ YX (1) 6/23/2009 11/3/2009
Endeavor-Mesaba 9E-XJ X 7/1/2010 1/4/2012
Atlantic Southeast-ExpressJet EV-XE X 8/4/2010 12/31/2011
Notes: (i) All merger episodes are horizontal mergers. (ii) Announcement date is the first date that a merger was
announced to the public, and it is obtained through sources including carriers’ official websites and news databases.
(iii) Cases marked with ∆ in the Pre-Merger Bankruptcy column indicates that the merging carriers were not officially
bankrupt but suffered from serious financial issues. (iv) Full integration entails that the merging airlines have fully
integrated their ticketing systems and joint itineraries with a single operating certificate from the FAA. (v) The
WN-TZ merger was finalized but its full integration date is not reliably documented in publicly available sources.
Carrier-level wage and employment information is derived from a number of data
sources provided by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. In particular, Form 41
Financial Reports contains financial information for certified U.S. air carriers, including
balance sheet, cash flow, employment, income statement, fuel cost and consumption,
aircraft operating expenses, and operating expenses. Schedule P-6 Expenses by Objec-
tive Grouping contains quarterly operating expenses for carriers with annual operating
revenues of $20 million or more and includes items such as salaries, benefits, materials
purchased, services purchased, depreciation, amortization, food, and other operating
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expenses. In addition, Schedule P-1A Employees provides monthly carrier employment
information, which breaks down the total number of employees by full time and part
time employees. We aggregate the employee count information to quarterly level and
use it to calculate the per capita benchmark for quarterly salary and salary plus fringe
benefits.
Additionally, we utilize Schedule P-10 Annual Employees Statistics by Labor Cat-
egory that provides annual numbers of total employees by occupation types.9 Other
carrier-year-quarter level characteristics such as revenue passenger miles, market miles
flown, load factor, and number of enplanements that capture the size and efficiency of
various dimensions of airline operations are obtained from Form T-100. In addition,
we account for an airline’s unionization level and construct the debt-to-asset ratio as a
proxy for the carrier’s financial leverage.10 Lastly, all nominal variables are converted
into real values in 2018 prices using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS).
It is worth noting that prior airline labor market studies tend to utilize data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) or the Census (e.g., Card and Saunders 1998;
Hirsch and Macpherson 2000; Hirsch 2007). While such data sources offer rich accounts
of individual attributes of airline employees, they do not provide the appropriate data
support for our study as individual level data do not allow differentiation across carriers
as well as matching with airline merger episodes (see Hirsch (2007) for a discussion on
the advantages and drawbacks of airline level vs. individual level data).
9Note that Schedule P-10 groups workers into 15 different categories, while the wage information
from Schedule P-6 classifies them into six categories. The specific categories from Schedule P-6 are
as follows: 1) Pilots (Pilots and Co-pilots + Other Flight Personnel); 2) Flight Attendants (Passen-
ger/General Services and Administration); 3) Mechanics and Maintenance (Maintenance); 4) Traffic
and Handling (Aircraft and Traffic Handling Group 1 + General Aircraft and Traffic Handling + Air-
craft Control + Passenger Handling + Cargo Handling); 5) General Management (General Manager);
and 6) Other (Trainees and Instructors + Statistical Personnel + Traffic Solicitors + Other Transport
Related).
10The unionization and debt-to-asset measures are described in detail in Section 4.2.
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide a list of the variables employed in our study and their
descriptive statistics (at carrier-year-quarter level), respectively. Table 2.A1 in the
Appendix also shows the summary statistics for the legacy airline and LCC subsample.
Since the mergers in our study involve airlines of different scales (mostly legacy airlines
and LCCs), it is not surprising that our variables of interest demonstrate large variances
and are driven by the legacy airline and LCC subsample. In addition, Figure 2.1 (Figure
2.A1) plots the evolution of quarterly average wage (average wage plus fringe benefits)
with respect to the merger episodes for employees in merging and non-merging airlines.
While employees in merging airlines on average enjoy a higher wage (and wage plus
fringe benefits) compared to their non-merging airline counterparts, the two trajectories
follow fairly similar common trends over time. Such observations help motivate our
difference-in-differences approach that we will describe in detail in the next subsection.
Figure 2.1: Merging and Non-Merging Carrier’s Quarterly Wage Time Trend
Note: Vertical lines indicate merger announcement years. Merging carriers are those that were involved in mergers at
any point during our sample period. Non-merging carriers are those that were never involved into any merger.
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Table 2.2: Variable Sources and Descriptions
Variable Descriptions




Wage Total salaries of all employees/Number of total employees, it
WageBene Total salaries + fringe benefits of all employees/ Number of total
employees, it
KMP Total capital and material costs/Revenue departures performed, it
FC Total fuel costs/Total miles flown, it
Schedule P-1A
Empfull Number of full-time employees, it
Emppart Number of part-time employees, it
Emptotal Number of total employees, it
Schedule P-10
GeneralManage Number of general management employees, iy
PilotsCopilots Number of pilot and co-pilot employees, iy
FlightAttendents Number of flight attendant employees, iy
Maintenance Number of mechanic and maintenance employees, iy
Traffic Number of aircraft and traffic handling employees, iy
OthersEmp Number of other employees, iy
Emptotaly Number of total employees, iy
Form T-100
RPM Revenue Passenger Miles= N enplanements×Total miles flown, it
ASL Average Stage Length= Total miles flown/N departures, it
ASM Available Seat Miles=N seats×Total miles flown, it
N enplanements Total number of enplanements, it
N routes Total number of directional routes, it
Loadfactor N enplanements/N seats, it
Networksize Total number of routes from origin of carrier i / Total number of
routes from origin, it
Bankruptcy Indicator equal 1 if carrier i is bankrupt at time t, it
N hub Total number of routes involving hubs, it
Distance Average miles flown, it
N departures Revenue departures performed, it
N seats Total number of seats, it
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for All Carriers Sample
Mean S.D. Min Max
Wage 15,512 5,572 450 70,820
Wage+Benefits 21,312 7,938 545 89,641
Total Employment 11,849 22,331 25.30 108,767
Merger02 0.042 0.200 0 1
Merger35 0.036 0.186 0 1
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 596,234 7,497,692 449 388,615,776
Fuel Costs (FC) 641 5,136 0.000 155,760
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) 2,474,362 3,114,997 468 26,912,346
Average Stage Length (ASL) 135 313 0.431 6,035
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 3,288,074 3,894,663 1,459 29,481,190
Debt-to-Asset 0.921 0.645 -2.45 10.70
Unionization 0.148 0.355 0 1
N enplanements 3,932,740 6,684,090 5 42,872,537
N routes 311 350 1 1,913
Load Factor 0.661 0.137 0.006 1
Network Size 0.265 0.149 0.007 1
Bankruptcy 0.003 0.057 0 1
N hub 73.40 182 0 1,055
Distance 804 489 42 6,035
Note: (i) Observations are at carrier-year-quarter level, and sample size is 4,084 for all variables. (ii) Merger02 is a
dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iii) Carrier-level
time-varying controls are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (iv) All nominal
variables are converted into real values in 2018 prices using the CPI from the BLS.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
We follow prior retrospective merger studies in the airline industry, e.g., Prince and
Simon (2017) and Chen and Gayle (2019), and adopt a difference-in-differences (DID)
approach that compares the change in labor market outcomes of merging airlines before
and after the merger episode, relative to the non-merging airlines over the same pre-
and post-merger periods.11 Similar to Prince and Simon (2017), we also allow the
11In our DID setup, for a given merger, the non-merging carriers in the control group consist of
carriers that were not involved in that specific merger. In other words, this would include carriers
that were never involved in any merger episode and carriers that merged as part of a different merger
during our sample period. For instance, UA and CO would serve as the time-wise control for the
treated (WN and FL) when analyzing the WN-FL merger. The identification strategy assumes that,
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impact of mergers to vary over time by distinguishing short-term versus long-term
effects. Specifically, we consider the following DID specification:
yit = α + β1Merger02it + β2Merger35it + γXit + ρi + σt + εit (2.1)
where yit denotes the labor market outcomes including wage per worker, wage plus
fringe benefits per worker, and total employment, for carrier i at time t; Xit is the
set of time-varying carrier-level controls derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 as
described in Table 2.2;12 ρi and σt are the carrier and time fixed effects, respectively.
Following Prince and Simon (2017), Merger02 it is a dummy variable denoting whether
the carrier of interest merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 it indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years
(i.e., between the past 9 and 20 quarters). We define the merger dummies equal 1
upon the official announcement from the acquiring and acquired airlines.13 To study
the labor market impact of mergers, the coefficient on Merger02 it thus identifies the
short-term effect of the merger, while the coefficient on Merger35 it absorbs the longer-
term impact. Specifically, the coefficient on Merger02 it captures the change in labor
as is the case in our sample, the announcement (or completion) quarters do not perfectly coincide
between mergers.
12Following prior literature (e.g., Banker and Johnston 1993), we include these time-varying carrier
level characteristics to control for cost drivers of airline operations that may affect wage and employ-
ment determination. For instance, Capital Material Costs (KMP) and Fuel Costs (FC) capture the
costs of other factor inputs; while Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM), Average Stage Length (ASL), and
Average Seat Miles (ASM) are proxies for airlines’ output capacities. Overall, we would expect these
controls to be positively correlated with an airline’s average employment levels and average wages.
13In many cases, the acquiring and acquired airlines continue to operate under their separate brands
post-merger. But in cases like the Southwest-Morris merger, where Morris was acquired and stopped
operating as a separate brand post-merger, we would focus on the acquiring carrier for the pre- and
post-merger comparison – pre-merger data from the acquired carrier are only utilized as a potential
control group for other horizontal mergers (if applicable). Our study also considers two alternative
treatments of acquiring and acquired carriers, including 1) dropping all acquired airlines in our sample;
and 2) modifying the carrier identifiers to combine the acquiring and acquired carriers’ pre-merger
data. The corresponding results are qualitatively similar to our baseline findings and are available
upon request.
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market outcomes for carrier i in the first two years after merging relative to the change
in labor outcomes for carriers that did not engage in mergers during the previous
two years, within the same pre- and post-merger periods. Similarly, the coefficient on
Merger35 it captures the change in labor market outcomes for carrier i in the third to
fifth years after merging relative to the change in labor outcomes for carriers that did
not merge during the previous three to five years, within the same pre- and post-merger
periods.
We first estimate Equation 2.1 using the full list of 13 merger episodes with the
control group being based on non-merging major carriers, LCCs, and regional carriers.
Because there exist significant wage premiums for major airline employees over their
regional airline counterparts (Hirsch and Macpherson 2000; Hirsch 2007) and given
the large variability in the regional airlines in terms of their sizes, routing, financial
conditions, etc, we also consider a subsample of six large-scale merger cases that only
involve major carriers and LCCs and exclude regional carriers in the comparison group
in order to define a more comparable control group of airlines not involved in the
mergers.14
As outlined in Section 3.1, Figures 2.1 and 2.A1 provide some preliminary visual
evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption in our empirical context. To further
assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption for our difference-in-differences




βτLeadsit+τ +β1Merger02it +β2Merger35it +γXit + ρi +σt + εit (2.2)
where Leadsit+τ are time dummies that equal 1 if it is the τ
th quarter (for up to eight
14The six merger cases involving majors and LCCs include AA-TW, US-HP, DL-NW, UA-CO,
WN-FL, and AA-US. The selection is based on the five merger cases studied in Prince and Simon
(2017), which we then augment with the more recent AA-US merger.
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quarters) before the merger of airline i at time t was announced and 0 otherwise.15
The time dummies are thus mutually exclusive of each other so that the implied effects
on the dependent variable given by their coefficients are not additive.
Similar to other retrospective merger studies, a potential endogeneity issue in our
empirical design is that the merger outcomes could be the result of endogenous decisions
made by the acquiring and target airlines. In airline retrospective studies that consider
impact of mergers on product quality (e.g., Prince and Simon 2017 and Chen and Gayle
2019), the endogeneity issue may not be as apparent since they consider the impact
of mergers on product quality, where the motivation to merge may only be indirectly
correlated with product quality changes. In our context, however, according to Arnold
(2019), acquiring firms may selectively target firms that will be profitable in the future,
e.g., new low cost carriers experiencing fast growth. We would thus expect a target
airline to grow due to the increased productivity even absent of any merger. Therefore,
the estimated impact of mergers on labor market outcomes could be biased upward.
On the other hand, acquiring firms could also target mismanaged businesses that are
underperforming. If merger targets are chosen in such a way, we may expect wage and
employment to be falling in target firms before the merger. Therefore, the estimates
could also be downward biased if the falling employment at target firms would have
been even greater absent of the merger.
As an effort to alleviate these identification concerns, we first conduct a sensitivity
test on the main DID model itself. Specifically, despite the checks for the parallel trends
assumption described earlier, one might still be concerned about the pre-treatment
characteristics being related to the dynamics of the dependent variables and unbal-
anced between groups. We thus employ an inverse probability of treatment weighting
15Here, we define two years preceding a given merger as the pre-merger period and up to five years
following the merger as the post-merger period. Note that data beyond five years post-merger are
still retained.
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method using propensity scores with its implementation procedures described in detail
in Section 4.2. Next, we also re-estimate our main DID specifications for a subsample
of large-scale airline mergers that only involve legacy carriers and LCCs (i.e., exclud-
ing mergers involving regional affiliates), which presents more consistent comparison
groups compared to mergers involving regional carriers. Lastly, we consider a subsam-
ple of mergers that exclude bankrupt airlines to mitigate the concern regarding the
acquiring airlines strategically targeting underperformers.16
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Baseline Findings
We first examine the wage impact of mergers by estimating Equation 2.1 using natural
log of salary per employee and salary plus fringe benefit per employee as the dependent
variables. Since the dependent variables of interest already account for carriers’ quar-
terly total employment, our study will thus focus on wage impact as the main labor
market outcome of interest. Table 2.4 presents our baseline DID estimates based on
the full sample of carriers included in our data (Columns (1) and (2)) as well as a sub-
sample focusing on large-scale mergers involving major carriers and LCCs (Columns
(3) and (4)). Our main variables of interest are Merger02 and Merger35, which capture
the short-term (2 years) and long-term (3-5 years) wage impact of mergers. While we
do not observe any short-run wage impact of mergers, the merging airlines consistently
experience an approximately 5% decrease in the per capita salary (and fringe benefits)
in the three to five years following the merger episodes, relative to the non-merging
16As argued in McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), the difference in pre-merger performance is sys-
tematic of differing motivations for the merger – poorly performing plants are more likely to involve
managerial discipline motives, while synergies are more likely to drive acquisitions of above-average
performers. In this sense, robustness check with a subsample that excludes bankruptcy related mergers
may only partially solve the endogeneity issue.
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control group airlines during the same pre- and post-merger periods. When we focus on
large-scale mergers involving major airlines and LCCs, the magnitude of the long-term
wage reduction increases to approximately 9%, which echoes the findings in Arnold
(2019) that the labor market impact is larger in mergers with higher stakes.
Table 2.4: Wage Impact (DID)
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Merger02 0.015 0.004 0.000 -0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Merger35 -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.084*** -0.093***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.104** 0.107** 0.020 0.000
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.059)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.004 0.005 0.071 0.070
(0.005) (0.005) (0.046) (0.054)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.093*** -0.075*** 0.077 0.184
(0.026) (0.027) (0.124) (0.122)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.016 -0.060 0.234*** 0.181**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.076) (0.077)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.131*** 0.045 0.105 -0.066
(0.032) (0.035) (0.122) (0.123)
Observations 4,082 4,082 1,462 1,462
Number of Carriers 108 108 25 25
R-squared 0.696 0.746 0.808 0.855
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) Merger02
is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iv) Carrier-level
time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natual logs and are derived from Schedule P-6
and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying carrier characteristics such as N enplanements,
Nroutes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (vi) All models
include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (vii) *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To complement to our findings on the wage impact, we next present the baseline
employment impact. Table 2.5 presents the DID estimates based on the full sample
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as well as the major airline and LCC subsample. In addition, we also distinguish
between full-time and part-time employment in Columns (2) and (3) and Columns
(5) and (6) for the full sample and the major carrier/LCC subsample, respectively.
The coefficient on the Merger02 variable in Column (1) suggests that the merging
airline with a merger within the past two years is associated with approximately an
15% decrease in its overall employment level, relative to the non-merging control group
airlines in the same pre- and post-merger periods. On the other hand, we do not observe
a similar reduction in employment in the longer-term as indicated by the statistically
insignificant coefficient on the Merger35 variable. When focusing on large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs, we observe in Column (4) a much smaller short-
term reduction but a larger long-term decrease in employment compared to the full
sample results. In Table 2.A2 in the Appendix, we also provide evidence of potential
heterogeneity in the employment impact of airline mergers by occupation types, with
short-term downsizing primarily among flight attendants and ground crew, and long-
term expansion in managerial staff.17
Overall, our baseline results point to a significant reduction in merging airlines’
long-term per capita salaries and fringe benefits following the mergers. The effect
is particularly salient among large-scale mergers involving major airlines and LCCs.
Our results also document a negative short-term employment impact of mergers with
varying magnitudes depending on the time frame and occupation types.
17While Schedule P-10 categorizes the total employment into specific occupation types, it does not
offer the matching salary measure for each occupation type. Meanwhile, Schedule P-6 only provides
carrier-level total salaries and benefits. Our data limitation thus unfortunately does not allow us to
further parse the wage impact by occupation types.
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Table 2.5: Employment Impact (DID)
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnEmptotal lnEmpfull lnEmppart lnEmptotal lnEmpfull lnEmppart
Merger02 -0.156*** -0.144*** -0.262*** -0.051*** -0.053*** 0.022
(0.021) (0.022) (0.052) (0.014) (0.014) (0.039)
Merger35 -0.012 -0.002 -0.107** -0.033** -0.034** -0.045
(0.017) (0.018) (0.048) (0.016) (0.016) (0.047)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.507*** 0.519*** 0.472*** 0.500*** 0.483*** 0.775***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.104) (0.112) (0.126)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.000 0.001 0.048** 0.384*** 0.424*** 0.067
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.094) (0.103) (0.090)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.484*** -0.506*** -0.263*** -0.974*** -1.132*** -0.098
(0.040) (0.039) (0.078) (0.198) (0.192) (0.524)
Average Stage Length (ASL) -0.441*** -0.383*** -0.882*** -0.499*** -0.427*** -1.601***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.094) (0.111) (0.111) (0.273)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.136*** 0.204*** -0.353*** 0.079 0.262 -1.407**
(0.046) (0.044) (0.104) (0.193) (0.184) (0.572)
Observations 4,082 4,082 3,876 1,462 1,462 1,459
Number of Carriers 108 108 108 25 25 25
R-squared 0.984 0.983 0.936 0.993 0.994 0.943
Carrier FE y y y y y y
Time FE y y y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) Merger02
is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iv) Carrier-level
time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6
and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying carrier characteristics such as N enplanements,
Nroutes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (vi) All models
include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (viii) *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
We perform a number of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our baseline find-
ings.18 We first assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption behind our baseline
DID specification by estimating a generalized DID as specified in Equation 2.2. In Fig-
ure 2.2, we plot the estimated coefficients on the eight pre-merger quarterly dummies,
Merger02, and Merger35 based on the full sample. In addition, we also plot in Fig-
ure 2.3 the estimated coefficients on the five post-merger year-specific lag indicators
18Our robustness checks will focus on the wage impact specifications since the dependent variables
there already account for carriers’ quarterly total employment.
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Figure 2.2: Pre-Merger Common Trends
(a) Wage Per Worker (b) Wage Plus Fringe Benefits Per Worker
Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients on the eight pre-merger quarterly dummies, Merger02, and Merger35
in Equation 2 based on the full sample. The dependent variables in Panels (a) and (b) are wage per worker and wage
plus fringe benefits per worker, respectively. The presented confidence intervals are at 95% level.
instead of the Merger02 and Merger35 dummies.19 In both figures, we observe that
in the eight quarters leading to the merger announcement, there are no statistically
significant differences in salary patterns between the merging and non-merging airlines.
This implies that the merging and non-merging airlines follow similar pre-merger com-
mon trends, which gives suggestive evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption.
Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the post-merger yearly dummies also corrobo-
rate our baseline findings that the merger impact on wage and benefits tend to exist
in the longer-term rather than short term.
Next, despite the suggestive evidence that our DID specifications conform to the
parallel trends assumption, one might still be concerned about the pre-treatment char-
acteristics being correlated with the dynamics of the dependent variables and unbal-
anced between groups. Thus, as a further robustness check on our baseline DID spec-
ifications, we also implement an inverse probability of treatment weighting method
19The corresponding point estimates are presented in Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5 in the Appendix that
also report the estimates based on the subsample of large-scale mergers involving major carriers and
LCCs. These estimates are in line with our baseline findings presented in Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.3: Pre-Merger Common Trends with Lag Indicators
(a) Wage Per Worker (b) Wage Plus Fringe Benefits Per Worker
Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients on the eight pre-merger quarterly dummies as well as five post-merger
yearly dummies in Equation 2 based on the full sample. The dependent variables in Panels (a) and (b) are wage per
worker and wage plus fringe benefits per worker, respectively. The presented confidence intervals are at 95% level.
using propensity scores. Specifically, we divide our sample into the following four
groups: Group 1 – merging carriers before; Group 2 – merging carriers after; Group 3
– non-merging carriers before; and Group 4 – non-merging carriers after. Each group
is then weighted using inverse probability of treatment weighting 1
propensity scoreg
for
group g = 1 to 4. To estimate the propensity scores, we fit a multinomial logistic
regression predicting the selection into a given group as a function of the set of co-
variates that we include in our DID specifications. It is important to only balance the
characteristics that are not likely affected by the program of interest in order to avoid
post-treatment biases (Rosenbaum, 1984). While some of our variables may be affected
after the mergers, especially those related to costs and output proxies (e.g., variables
such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASM, N enplanements), we seek to balance variables that are
less likely to be affected after the mergers (e.g., variables such as Networksize, N hub,
Distance as well as major airline and LCC status). Balancing and overlap tests are
performed using standardized mean differences as presented in Table 2.A3 and box
plots of propensity scores as shown in Figures 2.A2 and 2.A3 in the Appendix, respec-
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tively. Overall, these tests point to strong evidence toward the reduction in biases after
matching by propensity scores.20 It thus appears reasonable to consider the covariates’
distributions balanced between the different matched groups. Table 2.6 presents the
estimates of our baseline wage specifications upon applying IPTW, and they again
confirm the long-term reductions in post-merger salary and fringe benefits with the
estimated magnitudes of the impact smaller than those in Table 2.4.
Additionally, our baseline findings are based on merger announcement dates rather
than completion dates because it typically takes years for airlines to fully integrate and
the merger completion dates tend to be less reliably documented. However, in order
to ensure that our findings are not affected by the choice of merger dates, we redefine
the merger dummies, Merger02 and Merger35, based on merger completion dates and
re-estimate Equation 2.1. The results, as presented in Table 2.7, indicate that the
short-term wage effect based on merger completion dates in fact captures much of the
longer-term effect in our baseline findings based on merger announcement dates, which
in turn corroborates the robustness of our baseline findings.21
Since the acquiring airlines may strategically target underperforming airlines as
merger targets, we also conduct a robustness check by focusing on a subsample of
mergers that do not involve bankrupt airlines. Specifically, we exclude four bankruptcy
related mergers, including American (AA)-Trans World (TW), US Airways (US)-
American West (HP), Southwest (SW)-ATA (TZ), and American (AA)-US Airways
(US) as outlined in Table 2.1. We then estimate the same set of specifications as those
in Table 2.4 and present the estimates in Table 2.8.22 We conclude that the results
20With no established standards for determining substantial overlap of propensity scores, we use a
combination of balancing and overlap tests to assess whether the groups are similar enough to support
causal inference, e.g., standardized mean differences of less than 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 are considered small,
moderate, and large, respectively (Cohen, 2013).
21We also perform a corresponding check on the pre-merger common trends, similar to that pre-
sented in Figure 2.2, and we again find no statistically significant differences in salary patterns between
merging and non-merging airlines in the quarters leading to the merger completion.
22In addition, we also re-estimate our wage specifications for a subsample that exclude any bankrupt
61







Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.067*** 0.074***
(0.025) (0.024)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.008* 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.120** -0.142***
(0.054) (0.050)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.157*** 0.067*
(0.043) (0.041)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.166*** 0.099**
(0.053) (0.047)
Observations 4,082 4,082
Number of Carriers 108 108
R-squared 0.759 0.800
Carrier FE y y
Time FE y y
Note: (i) The sample is divided into 4 groups (Group 1 – merging carrier before; Group 2 – merging carrier after;
Group 3 – non-merging carrier before; Group 4 – non-merging carrier after) with each weighted using inverse
probability of treatment weighting 1
propensity scoreg
for each group g = 1 to 4. To estimate the propensity scores, we
fit a multinomial logistic regression predicting the selection into a given group as a function of the set of covariates
used in our DID specifications. Balancing and overlap test are performed using standardized mean differences in Table
2.A3 and box plots of propensity scores in Figures 2.A2 and 2.A3 in the Appendix, respectively. (ii) Merger02 is a
dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iii) Carrier-level
time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6
and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (iv) Other time-varying carrier characteristics N enplanements, Nroutes,
Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (v) All models include carrier
and year-quarter fixed effects. (vi) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (vii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
continue to be in line with our baseline findings after excluding the merger episodes in-
volving bankrupt airlines, which alleviates the concern regarding the acquiring airlines’
strategically choosing underperforming merger targets.
Lastly, carriers that are in financial distress but not yet in bankruptcy could also
carrier from the entire sample period. The results, as presented in Table 2.A6, are qualitatively similar
to those in Table 2.8.
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Table 2.7: Wage Impact (DID) Based on Merger Completion
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Merger02 -0.036** -0.051*** -0.118*** -0.117***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016)
Merger35 -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.111*** -0.103***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.104** 0.107** 0.020 0.001
(0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.058)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.003 0.005 0.073 0.072
(0.005) (0.005) (0.045) (0.053)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.092*** -0.074*** 0.063 0.165
(0.026) (0.027) (0.122) (0.120)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.016 -0.061 0.245*** 0.191**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.076) (0.077)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.131*** 0.045 0.130 -0.041
(0.032) (0.035) (0.121) (0.122)
Observations 4,082 4,082 1,462 1,462
Number of Carriers 108 108 25 25
R-squared 0.695 0.746 0.812 0.857
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) Merger02
is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the two years (eight quarters) after the completion
of merger. Similarly, Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the three to five years (9-20 quarters)
after the completion of merger. (iv) Carrier-level time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are
in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying
carrier characteristics such as N enplanements, Nroutes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance
are controlled in all columns. (vi) All models include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. (viii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
be likely candidates to merge with carriers that are in a better financial position.
Following Ma (2019) that shows that capital structure can affect airlines’ decisions
when responding to Southwest Airlines entry threat and actual entry, we augment our
main wage specification by including airlines’ debt-to-asset ratio as a proxy for their
financial leverage.23 As a continuous variable, the debt-to-asset ratio would potentially
23The debt-to-asset ratio is defined as total debts divided by total assets. We derive the variable
from Schedule B-1 of the Air Carrier Financial Reports from the BTS that contains quarterly operating
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Table 2.8: Wage Impact (DID) Excluding Mergers Involving Bankrupt Carriers
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Merger02 0.010 0.027* 0.021 0.039*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
Merger35 -0.061*** -0.039** -0.100*** -0.062***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.107** 0.108** 0.015 -0.008
(0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.061)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.002 0.005 0.071 0.071
(0.005) (0.005) (0.047) (0.055)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.094*** -0.076*** 0.076 0.213*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.127) (0.123)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.009 -0.066 0.250*** 0.195**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.078) (0.078)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.131*** 0.045 0.128 -0.077
(0.032) (0.035) (0.127) (0.127)
Observations 3,933 3,933 1,378 1,378
Number of Carriers 108 108 25 25
R-squared 0.694 0.745 0.811 0.861
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) Four bankruptcy related mergers, including AA-TW, US-HP,
SW-TZ, and AA-US as outlined in Table 2.1, are excluded in this analysis. (iii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is
based on the three mergers involving non-bankrupt major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging
major carriers and LCCs. (iv) Merger02 is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the
previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly, Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to
five years (9-20 quarters). (v) Carrier-level time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in
natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (vi) Other time-varying
carrier characteristics N enplanements, N routes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are
controlled in all columns. (vii) All models include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (viii) The numbers of carriers
remain the same since we only only exclude merging carriers that became bankrupt during the post-merger period in
this analysis. (ix) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (x) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
provide a more accurate depiction of the airline’s financial condition than a dummy
variable on the carrier’s bankruptcy status. In addition, we also include a dummy
variable that indicates whether the workforce of a major airline (or LCC) is significantly
unionized.24 Due to the lack of reliable data sources, the unionization dummy does
balance sheet statements for large certificated U.S. air carriers including items as cash, short-term
investments, accounts receivable, long-term debt, accounts payable, and salaries and wages.
24The unionization dummy is constructed utilizing various data sources including the Association
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not include regional carriers. Table 2.9 presents the results from our augmented wage
specification that includes the debt-to-asset ratio variable and the unionization dummy.
We again observe that the estimates on the post-merger dummies are consistent with
our baseline findings in Table 2.4.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In line with the impact of merger-induced monopsony power discussed in Marinescu
and Hovenkamp (2019) and Naidu et al. (2018), our findings point to a consistently
negative labor market impact of airline mergers with a significant reduction in merg-
ing airlines’ short-term employment level and long-term per capita salaries and fringe
benefits following the mergers, particularly among large-scale mergers involving major
airlines and low cost carriers. The short-term employment impact could reflect ad-
justment costs due to the merger, while the long-term post-merger wage suppression
is consistent with the inverse relation between labor market concentration and wage
levels that Benmelech et al. (2018) find to become more pronounced over time.25 Since
the within-airline seniority ranks help impose barriers to cross-airline mobility (Hirsch,
2007), which can effectively reduce the elasticity of labor supply, our findings further
imply that while the seniority integration process can hinder the efficient integration
of the merging airlines, it may potentially reinforce the integrated airlines’ monopsony
power and suppress salaries and benefits over time despite the heavy union presence in
the industry. Although data limitations prevent us from directly testing this potential
of Flight Attendants (AFA) website, Communications Workers of America (CWA) website, carriers’
official websites, Form 10-K from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and extensive news article
searches.
25It is worth noting that mergers could entail less competition for labor and thus strengthened
monoposony power even for the non-merging carriers. This could bias our estimates toward zero, which
implies that if anything, our estimates provide a lower bound of the negative wage and employment
impact of airline mergers.
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Table 2.9: Wage Impact (DID) with Unionization and Debt-to-Asset Ratio Controls
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Merger02 0.013 0.001 0.008 -0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Merger35 -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.091*** -0.095***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.008 -0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.051) (0.059)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.004 0.006 0.075 0.080
(0.005) (0.005) (0.047) (0.054)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.084** -0.080** 0.078 0.187
(0.034) (0.037) (0.122) (0.121)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.057* -0.020 0.198** 0.180**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.080) (0.081)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.141*** 0.071 0.069 -0.078
(0.038) (0.043) (0.121) (0.123)
Unionization 0.062*** 0.038* 0.106*** 0.053**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Debt-to-Asset -0.002 -0.003 0.013** 0.017*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 3,996 3,996 1,461 1,461
Number of Carriers 107 107 25 25
R-squared 0.718 0.761 0.812 0.856
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) Merger02
is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iv) Carrier-level
time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6
and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying carrier characteristics such as N enplanements,
Nroutes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (vi) All models
include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (viii) *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
mechanism, our finding regarding the differential short-term and long-term wage effects
lends support toward the explanation.
Naidu et al. (2018) point out that, while the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide specific analytical frame-
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works for evaluating the product market consequences of mergers, they do not offer
guidance on how to weigh in on the potential adverse labor market impact of mergers.
Our findings confirm the negative labor market impact of mergers in the context of
the airline industry and thus offer important policy implications toward the ongoing
discussions regarding how to account for employer monopsony power during mergers
and acquisitions. For instance, the short-term downsizing, potentially centered around
flight attendants and ground crew, and long-term expansion in managerial positions,
coupled with an overall long-term post-merger wage suppression, may impose consid-
erable equity and welfare concerns.
While our paper aims to provide first evidence of the labor market impact of airline
mergers, its scope is admittedly curbed by our data limitations, which then paves
the way for future research. For example, the labor market outcome data in our
study are at airline level rather than airline-occupation level. This prevents us from
exploring more detailed occupation-specific wage impact of mergers, e.g., wage impact
may depend on the composition of airlines’ workforce, or certain types of airline workers
could be more likely to be subject to the exercise of airline market power than others.
Administrative data on airline employment that capture geographical categorization
of the relevant labor market as well as information on employee seniority ranks would
also help one exploit local variations in employer monopsony power and further parse
the role of employer monopsony versus seniority integration in explaining the observed
labor market impact of airline mergers. Lastly, one could also follow studies such as Ma
et al. (2020) that perform comparative analysis of airline mergers involving overlapping
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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 2.A1: Merging and Non-Merging Carrier’s Quarterly Wage Plus Benefit Time Trend
Note: Vertical lines indicate merger announcement years. Merging carriers are those that were involved in mergers at
any point during our sample period. Non-merging carriers are those that were never involved into any merger.
Figure 2.A2: Overlap Test Before IPTW
Note: (i) The figure presents the overlap test of the distributions of propensity scores for each of the four groups prior
to applying the IPTW. The box marks the first and third quartiles of the propensity scores with a line drawn at the
median.
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Figure 2.A3: Overlap Test After IPTW
(i) The figure presents the overlap test of the distributions of propensity scores for each of the four groups after applying
the IPTW. The box marks the first and third quartiles of the propensity scores with a line drawn at the median.
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Table 2.A1: Summary Statistics for Majors and LCCs Subsample
Mean S.D Min Max
Wage 16,935 4,208 3,300 56,273
Wage+Benefits 23,354 6,339 3,552 70,266
Total Employment 28,666 30,148 67.30 108,767
Merger02 0.061 0.239 0 1
Merger35 0.052 0.222 0 1
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 45,435 343,144 2,960 7,083,547
Fuel Costs (FC) 234 481 13 16,489
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) 3,754,994 2,400,004 65,926 20,083,750
Average Stage Length (ASL) 41.40 86.20 3.73 1,389
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 4,980,549 2,971,033 118,234 23,272,188
Debt-to-Asset 0.899 0.592 -0.769 10.70
Unionization 0.404 0.491 0 1
N enplanements 8,994,261 8,857,388 662 42,872,537
N routes 469 398 1 1,896
Load Factor 0.704 0.097 0.186 0.945
Network Size 0.277 0.121 0.024 0.598
Bankruptcy 0.007 0.083 0 1
N hub 201 256 0 1,055
Distance 902 252 348 2,258
Note: (i) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers involving major carriers and LCCs with
the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (ii) Observations are at carrier-year-quarter level, and
sample size is 1,462 for all variables. (iii) Merger02 is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during
the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly, Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past
three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iv) Carrier-level time-varying controls are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form
T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) All nominal variables are converted into real values in 2018 prices using the CPI
from the BLS.
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Table 2.A2: Employment Subcategories (DID, Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnGeneralManage lnPilotsCopilots lnFlightAttendents lnMaintenance lnTraffic lnOthersEmp
Merger02 0.097 -0.066*** -0.165*** -0.211*** -0.249*** -0.204***
(0.084) (0.025) (0.058) (0.050) (0.047) (0.054)
Merger35 0.442*** 0.020 0.010 0.027 -0.146*** -0.016
(0.073) (0.021) (0.036) (0.034) (0.048) (0.044)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.214*** 0.567*** 0.514*** 0.581*** 0.525*** 0.470***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) (0.058)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.092*** -0.015 -0.021 -0.035*** 0.057*** -0.070***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.494*** -0.681*** -0.268*** -0.517*** -0.591*** -0.269***
(0.099) (0.057) (0.102) (0.072) (0.077) (0.096)
Average Stage Length (ASL) -0.438*** -0.513*** -0.568*** -0.384*** -0.695*** -0.572***
(0.094) (0.071) (0.102) (0.067) (0.083) (0.091)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.190* 0.218*** -0.003 0.079 -0.052 -0.074
(0.104) (0.064) (0.131) (0.078) (0.092) (0.112)
Observations 3,494 3,719 3,518 3,737 3,694 3,679
Number of Carriers 108 108 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.803 0.951 0.908 0.935 0.955 0.928
Carrier FE y y y y y y
Time FE y y y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) Merger02 is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier
merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly, Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged
within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iii) Carrier-level time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM,
ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2.
(iv) Other time-varying carrier characteristics N enplanements, N routes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy,
N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (v) All models include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vi)
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (vii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.A3: Balancing Test Before and After IPTW
Mean Unweighted Standardized Mean Differences Weighted Standardized Mean Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 1 vs. 4 2 vs. 3 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 1 vs. 4 2 vs. 3 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4
Networksize 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.368 0.528 0.657 0.321 0.438 0.060 -0.026 0.061 0.131 0.081 0.157 0.049
lnN hub 2.54 3.57 0.26 0.18 -0.340 0.997 1.056 1.442 1.511 0.081 0.056 0.037 0.049 -0.037 -0.026 0.024
lnDistance 6.53 6.62 6.47 6.49 -0.249 0.084 0.064 0.230 0.231 -0.023 0.040 -0.108 -0.105 -0.136 -0.137 0.013
Major 0.45 0.46 0.05 0.04 -0.020 1.041 1.107 1.065 1.131 0.074 -0.024 -0.047 -0.044 -0.015 -0.011 0.008
LCC 0.24 0.32 0.16 0.16 -0.188 0.189 0.195 0.378 0.384 0.006 0.042 0.034 0.038 -0.013 -0.009 0.004
Observations 983 296 136 2,669
Note: (i) Standardized mean difference is defined as the difference in means divided by the standard deviation.
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Table 2.A4: Pre-Merger Common Trends
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
MergingCarrier -0.047** -0.032 0.142*** 0.094***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.035)
TimeTrend 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
MergingCarrierTimeTrend 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lead8 0.016 0.039 -0.004 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040) (0.035)
Lead7 0.010 0.031 -0.024 -0.002
(0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.032)
Lead6 0.044 0.060* -0.010 0.012
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Lead5 0.020 0.027 -0.031 -0.032
(0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.036)
Lead4 -0.026 -0.032 -0.009 -0.019
(0.042) (0.052) (0.029) (0.030)
Lead3 0.027 0.019 -0.000 -0.011
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022)
Lead2 0.027 0.010 -0.010 -0.013
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Lead1 0.011 0.003 -0.004 -0.006
(0.032) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035)
Merger02 0.019 0.009 -0.004 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Merger35 -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.087*** -0.095***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.104** 0.107** -0.003 0.008 0.019 0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.045) (0.045) (0.026) (0.028) (0.051) (0.059)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.007* 0.007* 0.004 0.005 0.042** 0.041** 0.071 0.070
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020) (0.046) (0.054)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) 0.027 -0.003 -0.093*** -0.075*** 0.183 0.342*** 0.076 0.185
(0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.122)
Average Stage Length (ASL) -0.077*** -0.065*** 0.016 -0.060 0.369*** 0.291*** 0.237*** 0.182**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.045) (0.045) (0.070) (0.075) (0.076) (0.077)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) -0.101*** -0.031 0.131*** 0.045 0.123 -0.121 0.109 -0.066
(0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) (0.139) (0.141) (0.123) (0.124)
Observations 4,084 4,084 4,082 4,082 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462
Number of Carriers 108 108 108 108 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.395 0.460 0.696 0.746 0.677 0.741 0.808 0.855
Carrier FE n n y y n n y y
Time FE n n y y n n y y
Note: (i) We apply extended DID (Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)) and generalized DID models (Columns (3), (4), (7),
and (8)) to check pre-merger common trends. (ii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on six large-scale mergers
involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) Merger02
is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years (eight quarters). Similarly,
Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20 quarters). (iv) Carrier-level
time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6
and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying carrier characteristics N enplanements, Nroutes,
Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (vi) Generalized DID
includes carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. (viii) *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A5: Pre-Merger Common Trends with Lag Terms
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Lead8 0.018 0.041 -0.001 0.021
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040) (0.035)
Lead7 0.012 0.033 -0.022 0.001
(0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.032)
Lead6 0.045 0.061* -0.009 0.014
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Lead5 0.020 0.028 -0.032 -0.031
(0.038) (0.045) (0.034) (0.037)
Lead4 -0.025 -0.030 -0.008 -0.017
(0.042) (0.052) (0.029) (0.030)
Lead3 0.029 0.021 0.003 -0.006
(0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023)
Lead2 0.028 0.012 -0.006 -0.008
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Lead1 0.012 0.005 0.000 -0.002
(0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.034)
Lag1y 0.031* 0.024 0.008 -0.008
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Lag2y -0.005 -0.018 -0.021 -0.032
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Lag3y -0.034** -0.047*** -0.075*** -0.087***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018)
Lag4y -0.042** -0.049*** -0.097*** -0.099***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Lag5y -0.047*** -0.042** -0.085*** -0.084***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.104** 0.107** 0.018 -0.001
(0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.059)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.004 0.005 0.072 0.071
(0.005) (0.005) (0.046) (0.054)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.092*** -0.074*** 0.079 0.187
(0.026) (0.027) (0.125) (0.122)
Average Stage Length (ASL) 0.016 -0.061 0.234*** 0.178**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.077) (0.077)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.130*** 0.045 0.102 -0.073
(0.032) (0.035) (0.123) (0.124)
Observations 4,082 4,082 1,462 1,462
Number of Carriers 108 108 25 25
R-squared 0.696 0.746 0.807 0.854
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) We apply generalized DID models to check pre-merger common trends. (ii) The Majors and LCCs
subsample is based on six large-scale mergers involving major carriers and LCCs with the control group being
non-merging major carriers and LCCs. (iii) The Lag variables are time dummies indicating j years (1 ≤ j ≤ 5) post
the merger announcement. (iv) Carrier-level time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in
natural logs and are derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (v) Other time-varying
carrier characteristics N enplanements, Nroutes, Loadfactor, Networksize, Bankruptcy, N hub, and Distance are
controlled in all columns. (vi) Generalized DID includes carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (vii) Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. (viii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A6: Wage Impact (DID) Excluding All Bankrupt Carriers
All Carriers Majors and LCCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage lnWageBene lnWage lnWageBene
Merger02 -0.027 0.005 -0.032 -0.008
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Merger35 -0.084*** -0.045** -0.129*** -0.091***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
Capital Material Costs (KMP) 0.116** 0.116** -0.007 -0.028
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.062)
Fuel Costs (FC) 0.000 0.004 0.083* 0.082
(0.006) (0.006) (0.048) (0.056)
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) -0.087*** -0.065** 0.030 0.154
(0.027) (0.027) (0.133) (0.129)
Average Stage Length (ASL) -0.003 -0.073 0.260*** 0.210***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.080) (0.080)
Average Seat Miles (ASM) 0.123*** 0.036 0.203 0.020
(0.033) (0.035) (0.132) (0.132)
Observations 3,440 3,440 1,173 1,173
Number of Carriers 98 98 21 21
R-squared 0.691 0.741 0.820 0.870
Carrier FE y y y y
Time FE y y y y
Note: (i) All models are estimated using DID. (ii) Carriers that became bankrupt at any point during our entire
sample period are excluded in this analysis. (iii) The Majors and LCCs subsample is based on three mergers involving
non-bankrupt major carriers and LCCs with the control group being non-merging and non-bankrupt major carriers
and LCCs. (iv) Merger02 is a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier merged during the previous two years
(eight quarters). Similarly, Merger35 indicates whether the carrier merged within the past three to five years (9-20
quarters). (v) Carrier-level time-varying controls such as KMP, FC, RPM, ASL, and ASM are in natural logs and are
derived from Schedule P-6 and Form T-100 and described in Table 2.2. (vi) Other time-varying carrier characteristics
N enplanements, N routes, Loadfactor, Networksize, N hub, and Distance are controlled in all columns. (vii) All
models include carrier and year-quarter fixed effects. (viii) The number of carriers are different since we exclude
mergers involving bankrupt carriers across the sample periods. Given that ATA (TZ) is missing in our data and that
American (AA) is involved in 2 bankruptcy-related mergers with Trans Words (TW) and US Airways (US),
respectively, the number of carriers thus decreases by 10 compared to Table 2.8. (ix) Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. (x) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 3
Retail Marijuana Deregulation and
Housing Prices
3.1 Introduction
The rapid legalization of recreational marijuana has created a new industry in the
United States. Despite the quick succession of states passing these legalization mea-
sures, there is little evidence of how the local economy responds. Immediately upon
passage of legalization laws, states increase revenues with marijuana sales taxes and
decrease costs by reducing the burden of marijuana-related arrest and incarcerations.
Both of these examples create second-order effects on markets which have yet to be
considered. This research contributes to the growing marijuana legalization literature
by studying the cross-state effect of recreational marijuana legalization (RML) on the
housing market.
Other studies has considered the impact of marijuana legalization on residential
home prices, many of which are concerned with the effect of marijuana dispensaries.
Thomas and Tian (2020), Conklin et al. (2020), Tyndall (2019), and Burkhardt and
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Flyr (2019) all estimate the housing market response to new dispensary openings in
nearby neighborhoods. Among these papers, the evidence is decidedly mixed with
negative, positive, null, and positive results respectively. Cheng et al. (2018) use the
staggered adoption of city-level marijuana regulations within Colorado to estimate
a difference-in-differences model, finding a six percent price increase in the housing
market. Our key contribution to the literature is the estimation of a cross-state model,
which is made possible with a rich national level housing data set from the online real
estate database Zillow.com. We also provide new evidence of the effect of dispensaries
on nearby home values in both Colorado and Washington.
Twelve states and Washington D.C. have passed initiatives legalizing the use of
marijuana for recreational purposes since 2012. Additionally, 33 states and Washington
D.C. have passed medical marijuana laws since 1996. This quick shift in policy puts
the states at odds with the federal government, which still classifies marijuana as a
Schedule 1 narcotic on par with cocaine, heroin, and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).1
The disconnect between the public and the federal government reflects the evolution
of the perceived benefits of marijuana. Large majorities of American adults believe
that marijuana has medical benefits (Keyhani et al. (2018)), and adolescents have low
risk perceptions of the drug (Roditis and Halpern-Felsher (2015)) even though medical
professionals are unsure of its efficacy (Kondrad and Reid (2013); Carlini et al. (2017);
Fitzcharles et al. (2014); Braun et al. (2018)). Despite the public’s beliefs, most states
have been reluctant to legalize marijuana for recreational use. Concerns about the
potential effect on crime rates and the difficulty in policing impaired driving have been
cited as reasons to slow-walk the path to full recreational legalization.
Legalization could increase crime rates, as the drug’s effect can make users act more
erratically, and easy access to marijuana creates a low-risk trafficking network across
1From the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling
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state lines. It is well established that crime and the perception of crime negatively
impact home prices (Pope (2008); Buonanno et al. (2013)), so legalization might put
downward pressure on the housing markets of states with successful ballot measures.
Counter to the crime narrative however, early research suggests that there are no
negative effects. Brinkman and Mok-Lamme (2019) find a 19 percent decrease in crime
rate in Denver neighborhoods with dispensaries relative to the average crime rate in the
sample period. Similarly, Morris et al. (2014) and Huber et al. (2016) find decreases
in violent and property crimes following the passage of medical marijuana legalization.
There is also evidence that RML increased crime clearance rates by police in Colorado
and Washington (Makin et al. (2019)). Research on traffic incidents suggest similar
null or negative results in states with legal recreational (Hansen et al. (2020)) and
medical marijuana (Bartos et al. (2018)).
An emerging literature studies the impact of medical marijuana legalization on labor
market outcomes. Sabia and Nguyen (2018) find no effect on adult wages, employment
or hours worked and a small decrease in wages among young men with access to
marijuana dispensaries. Nicholas and Maclean (2019) focus on older adults, finding an
increase in the labor supply of those over the age of 51 with the largest effect coming
for adults with health conditions which qualify them for legal medical marijuana use. If
there are positive labor supply effects, then it is possible that the housing market could
be impacted directly through in-migration as individuals from non-legalization states
seek to enjoy the perceived benefits. Zambiasi and Stillman (2020) use a synthetic
control approach to estimate Colorado’s in and out-migration following its passage
of RML. Their results suggest that Colorado experienced a large positive inflow of
migrants as a result of legalization and no change in out-migration.
Immigration inflows have been shown to increase single family home prices in
Switzerland (Degen and Fischer (2017)), but decrease in the United Kingdom as
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wealthy native homeowners leave the newly immigrant-populated neighborhoods (Sá
(2015)). Despite these mixed results, the combination of reduced crime rates (and ar-
rests), migrant inflows, and a new source of sales tax revenue could increase demand for
housing in states that pass RML. Some of these states have used the new tax revenue
specifically for school funding, which is a mechanism through which home prices might
increase. There is a long literature on school resources and student outcomes (Card
and Krueger (1998); Jackson et al. (2016); Martorell et al. (2016)) and school capital
investment’s impact on the value of nearby homes (Cellini et al. (2010); Neilson and
Zimmerman (2014)). The combined effect of RML – increased revenue for public goods,
decreased crime, little or no change in traffic incidents, and positive labor supply and
migration inflow effects – lead naturally to the question of the real estate market. This
paper contributes to the literature by estimating the cross and within-state impacts of
RML on housing.
First we estimate the cross-state impact using Zillow housing data. The Zillow data
is at the individual property transaction level. The treatment group consists of home
transactions in states which have legalized the recreational use of marijuana and the
control group consists of home transactions in states which have have not legalized
it. We find consistent positive effects in the RML case of around 8 percent across a
number of specifications which include time and location fixed effects ranging from
the county level to the ZIP code level. The estimates are most pronounced when we
consider the date that the sale of recreational marijuana is made legal, suggesting that
housing demand responds primarily once the drug is being sold, not when the law is
victorious at the ballot.
We then extend the cross-state analysis by estimating an unconditional quantile
regression (UQR) as in Firpo et al. (2009) with city level fixed effects. Using city
level fixed effects controls for unobserved local property taxes which have long been
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recognized to influence the housing market (Oates (1969); Anderson (1986)). Doing
so provides additional insight into the forces driving our treatment effect. Due to the
large heterogeneity in housing markets across the country, the UQR estimates are more
robust against extreme value observations than our fixed effects models and provide
a more complete understanding of central tendency and dispersion measures. The
results of the UQR show positive effects in the top of the distribution following the
success of the ballot measure legalizing recreational marijuana, but no effect in the
lower half. The greatest impact occurs once it becomes legal to sell marijuana, with
large positive effects across the price distribution, especially in the middle three deciles.
Heterogeneous responses to a policy shock have not been well-researched in the housing
literature, making the findings here one of our major contributions.
Finally, we estimate a spatial model within Colorado and Washington using the Zil-
low housing data and dispensary location information from the Marijuana Enforcement
Division of the Colorado Department of Revenue and the Washington State Depart-
ment of Health. Our identification strategy follows that of Dronyk-Trosper (2017), who
use the staggered construction of municipal buildings such as fire stations to estimate
their impact on home prices. In our application, homes which are within two miles of a
dispensary at time t and have a second dispensary open within a half mile of the home
at time t + 1 increase in value by over 6 percent. The price appreciates the closer to
the new dispensary a home is, suggesting that the dispensary itself is a neighborhood
amenity which has some positive value among home buyers.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing robust evidence that
marijuana legalization has beneficial spillover effects at both the state and local levels.
Taken together, our three sets of results show that states which pass RML ballot
measures benefit relative to other states and that marijuana dispensaries provide a
boost to the home values in the immediate vicinity. Marijuana’s liberalization provides
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a novel source of tax revenue which states have used to fund capital expenditures,
especially in education and it acts as an amenity via the dispensaries that distribute
it. The creation of a new legal market has direct implications for the local economy,
as it establishes new dispensary jobs and reduces arrest rates. All of these factors
have well-established impacts on housing markets. Indeed our results show that the
spillover effects of marijuana legalization on the housing market are both statistically
and economically significant.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the history of medical and
recreational marijuana legalization in the United States, as well as potential mecha-
nisms through which legalization could impact the housing market. Section 3.3 details
three data sources used for estimation and presents summary statistics. Section 3.4
describes the empirical strategy and Section 3.5 presents the impact of marijuana le-
galization on housing markets.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Medical and Recreational Marijuana Legalization
Beginning in 1937, the federal government prohibited the use of marijuana for recre-
ational consumption and sale with The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 (Pub. L. No.
75-238, 50 Stat. 551). The law went into effect on October 1, 1937 and two days
later a Mexican-American man named Moses Baca was arrested by Denver police for
marijuana possession, the first such arrest in the country.2 In 1968 Richard Nixon won
the U.S. presidency on a platform of law and order, quickly establishing drug abuse
as “public enemy number one in the United States.” The Controlled Substance Act
2For a brief history of the first marijuana arrests, see: https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/drug-
war-prisoners-1-2-true-story-moses-sam-two-denver-drifters-became-cannabis-pioneers
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(Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236) of 1970 created tiers of illegal drugs indicating the
severity of negative health effects and the level of addictiveness. Marijuana is included
in the Schedule 1 tier, indicating that its severity is at the highest possible level along-
side addictive narcotics such as heroin. In 1973 the federal government established the
Drug Enforcement Agency, which was the primary entity responsible for policing drug
use in the country.
Some states introduced marijuana decriminalization proposals in response to the
federal government’s aggressive stance on marijuana, but that effort ultimately fell out
of favor and the intensity of the War on Drugs escalated in the 1980s and early 90s
(Pacula et al. (2003)). In 1996 California became the first state to legalize recreational
marijuana, marking the beginning of the end of punitive escalation that began with
the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937 and was amplified through the 70s, 80s, and 90s. Once
California passed the Compassionate Use Act in 1996, the floodgates were opened
and in the ensuing years states across the country legalized marijuana for medicinal
purposes. Table 3.2 shows this progress. As of May 2020, 33 states and Washington
DC have or are in the process of legalizing medical marijuana consumption.
Despite the progress in MML over the last 20 years, it has been a much slower path
to full recreational marijuana legalization. Colorado and Washington were the first two
states to approve RML on the ballot in 2012, 16 years after California passed its MML
law and after 18 other states had done the same. In the years since, Colorado and
Washington have been joined by Alaska, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington D.C. Some states have had significant lags
between their legalization measures passing a vote and the practical implementation
of the law. Massachusetts, for example, voted in favor of RML in November 2016
but it was not until November 2018 that dispensaries selling marijuana opened. It is
widely expected that this march of progress will continue in the 2020 election cycle
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and beyond. This paper contributes another data point to the debate over marijuana
legalization, demonstrating that those early adopter states have experienced significant
appreciations in home values since legalization has been implemented.
3.2.2 The Housing Market Connection
Marijuana legalization comes with a number of trade-offs that make its connection
to the housing market ambiguous. The expected direction of legalization’s effect de-
pends on a number of forces pushing in opposite directions. Increased public capital
expenditures and in-migration would increase demand for housing in the short run and,
assuming housing supply is fixed in the short run, raise prices. On the other hand,
out-migration, negative health impacts, and increases in crime rates could deflate home
values.
To establish the direction of the effect on home prices following marijuana legal-
ization, Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 show the trend in the national housing market since
2000, divided by when each state adopted RML. There are three cohorts of states. Fig-
ure 3.1 includes Colorado and Washington, the first two states to legalize recreational
marijuana in 2012. Figure 3.2 includes Oregon, which legalized in 2014, and Figure
3.3 includes California, Massachusetts, and Nevada, all of which legalized recreational
marijuana in 2016. The four other states and Washington D.C. which have legalized
recreational marijuana are not included because they are outside the sample for rea-
sons discussed in Section 3.1. Solid lines are treatment states across the three figures,
and dotted lines reflect states which did not legalize recreational marijuana. To verify
that this divergence is a feature of marijuana legalization and not a few wealthy states
outpacing the national trend, we divide non-RML states into three groups based on
average house price per square foot levels. The six treatment states would all fall into
the High average price per square foot grouping with the exception of Nevada, which
86
would be classified in the Middle group if it were not a treatment state. By by com-
paring the trend in those states to other wealthy and middle income states, we can get
a better idea of the impact legalization has had on the housing market.
Figure 3.1: Trend of Average House Price Per Sq. Foot (CO, WA)
Note: (i) Control states are divided into three groups – high, middle, and low – based on their
average home price per square foot. The low group is composed of Alabama, Florida, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. The middle
group consists of Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania. The high group is made of Connecticut, Washington D.C., Delaware,
Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin. (ii) The vertical line reflects the
recreational marijuana legalization date for Colorado and Washington, 2012.
Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 demonstrate that all three control groups show similar
housing market trends since 2000. The RML states meanwhile consistently diverge
from the control trends upon their respective cohorts’ legalization dates. Across the
three graphs, the price trend was similar across RML and non-RML states until 2012.
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Figure 3.2: Trend of Average House Price Per Sq. Foot (OR)
Note: The control grouping is the same as in Figure 3.1. The vertical line reflecting the RML
treatment date is 2014 for Oregon.
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Figure 3.3: Trend of Average House Price Per Sq. Foot (CA, MA, NV)
Note: The control grouping is the same as in Figure 3.1 and 3.2. The vertical line reflecting
the RML treatment date is 2016 for California, Massachusetts, and Nevada.
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Colorado and Washington display a clear divergence in their housing markets following
legalization at the end of 2012. A similar divergence can be seen in Figure 3.2 when
Oregon voted in favor of RML in 2014. At the end of the time trend, the 2016 legal-
ization cohort also see distinct jumps in the housing markets relative to the non-RML
states.
The housing markets of RML states have recovered faster and stronger than those
of non-RML states. The effect in Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are all despite the period
spanning the Great Recession. Volatility in the housing market can be seen clearly in
each figure; the market begins accelerating in 2002, peaks in 2006, and reaches its nadir
in 2011. The difference in recovery between RML and non-RML states can be seen
most dramatically in the first cohort of Colorado and Washington. This could reflect
slack in housing as the market over-corrected during the recession, but there can be
no doubt that those two states recovered at a faster rate than their economic peers. It
appears that the implementation of RML raised house prices despite the burden of the
housing market recovery.
3.2.3 Mechanisms
Having established that states which enacted RML laws received a positive boost during
the recovery period following the Great Recession, we now turn our attention to the
mechanisms responsible. We consider two possible avenues, which we will refer to
as the the “economic development” effect and the “amenity” effect. The economic
development effect considers long-run changes to the community which legalization
induces; increased tax revenue and spending on public goods that results is an example.
The amenity effect captures the role dispensaries have on nearby home values. This
reflects the local brick-and-mortar changes that occur due to RML. Our cross-state
models estimate the economic development effect and our spatial model estimates the
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amenity effect.
First consider the economic development effect. The illegal marijuana market prior
to legalization is necessarily un-taxed. In the political debate over legalization, sup-
porters often advocate for a mandate that marijuana sales taxes fund public goods
investment, including infrastructure improvements and education funding. For ex-
ample the disposition of Colorado marijuana tax revenue is first distributed to the
Public School Capital Construction Assistance Fund, and any revenue over $40 million
is transferred to the Public School Fund.3 There is a long literature on school re-
sources and student outcomes (Card and Krueger (1998); Jackson et al. (2016)). The
physical condition of school capital and government investment as a vehicle for stu-
dent achievement is also of interest in the existing literature (Martorell et al. (2016)).
There is further evidence that school capital investment increases the value of local
homes. Cellini et al. (2010) use a regression discontinuity design method, exploiting
local referenda on bond issuances for capital expenditures to identify the causal ef-
fect of referenda passage on the local housing market. Their results suggest a sizable
and immediate positive impact on local home values. Neilson and Zimmerman (2014)
study the staggered implementation of a school construction project in New Haven,
Connecticut, finding that home prices increase in the local neighborhood by approx-
imately 10%. We contribute to this literature by examining whether the passage of
recreational marijuana legalization laws – and therefore new sources of tax revenue –
affect local home prices.
Another potential mechanism of the economic development effect is migration. By
legalizing the use of marijuana, Colorado and other RML states become an attractive
option for residents of other states who value the ability to consume marijuana without
fear of legal repercussions. Zambiasi and Stillman (2020) find large migration inflows
3https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/disposition-marijuana-tax-revenue
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following Colorado’s passage of RML, supporting this hypothesis. For individuals who
migrate to a state with legal recreational marijuana, the cost of moving is less than
the consumption cost. Those who use marijuana for medicinal purposes could fall into
this category, as easy access to legal marijuana decreases the cost of obtaining and
consuming an ameliorative drug.
Assuming that housing supply does not increase in response to the success of RML,
in-migration of these individuals could affect local housing markets. The effect of inter-
country migration on housing markets is ambiguous in the existing literature (Degen
and Fischer (2017); Sá (2015)). However, there is substantial evidence that the number
of people migrating within the United States is shrinking and local labor markets con-
ditions and home equity have explain much of the decision to migrate (Henley (1998);
Foote (2016); Zabel (2012); Koşar et al. (2019)). Despite this downturn in internal mi-
gration, young educated households frequently move to areas with high quality business
environments (Chen and Rosenthal (2008)). Recreational marijuana legalization lib-
eralizes the criminal code, but it also creates a new industry in the states that enact
it. Business creation increases employment opportunities and growth (Baptista and
Preto (2011); Andersson and Noseleit (2011)), which in turn puts upward pressure on
housing markets (Liu et al. (2016); Reichert (1990)). Benefits (and potential costs) of
industry job creation and demand for marijuana from non-locals could be capitalized
into housing values (Cheng et al. (2018)).
We estimate the effect of marijuana legalization at different points of the process
(i.e. at the time of the vote to legalize, when the law goes into effect, and when the
first dispensaries open), which provides insight into the magnitude of the economic
development effect. Since the two-way fixed effects and UQR models define treatment
as all homes in a state, the coefficients should reflect the broad treatment inside each
state. Homes without nearby dispensaries therefore are likely not experiencing the
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positive shock through an amenity effect, but through secondary mechanisms such
as increased school funding and capital investment. We estimate the UQR model
to capture the sensitivity of the price distribution to the economic development effect.
The hedonic price function frequently estimated in the housing literature can be highly
non-linear. For this reason, the UQR model is our preferred model specification and the
primary contribution of this research’s estimates of RML on the economic development
effect in housing.
The amenity effect will be captured in our Spatial Difference-in-Differences model
(see Section 4). By restricting our sample to just homes near dispensaries in Colorado
and Washington, we recover the dispensaries’ effect on the nearby housing market.
This approach is in line with previous research, as prices exhibit localized variation
based on a number of amenity factors, including public school quality (Bogart (2000);
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004)), public transit options (Bajic (1983); Dewees (1976)),
water quality (Epp and Al-Ani (1979); Young and Teti (1984); Leggett and Bockstael
(2000)), rail lines (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001); Gibbons and Machin (2005); McMillen
and McDonald (2004)), and crime (Hellman and Naroff (1979)). Home prices vary
significantly as households are heterogeneous in their amenity preferences and income
(Gibbons and Machin (2008)). If dispensaries are an amenity – either positive or
negative – then we should be able to recover an effect with the Spatial Difference-in-
Differences model. Indeed other research has estimated the dispensary-housing market
connection (Thomas and Tian (2020); Conklin et al. (2020); Tyndall (2019); Burkhardt
and Flyr (2019)), but either did not use a spatial model as part of their identification
strategy or are limited to particular cities which might raise external validity concerns.
Recovering the amenity effect of dispensaries in Colorado and Washington using a novel
estimation method is the second major contribution of this research.
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3.3 Data
This research relies on three primary sources of data. First is a national housing data
set from the online real estate database company Zillow (Zillow (2017)). The second
is a hand-compiled data set identifying each states’ laws regarding the liberalization of
marijuana use. Finally, we have yearly data on the construction of marijuana dispen-
saries in Colorado and Washington.
3.3.1 Housing Data
Zillow is a popular tool used by the public to search for properties available for sale in
the United States. The company provides a centralized source of property transactions
through its Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset (ZTRAX).4 This dataset com-
piles multiple listing services (MLS) from all fifty states, Washington D.C., and other
U.S. territories to provide a comprehensive resource for real estate transactions.
The information includes not only details of a given housing market transaction,
such as the sales price and date, but also information about the house itself. The
ZTRAX repository provides access to a large number of home characteristics, such
as the number of rooms, square foot area of the property, and any structures on it.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for all homes in our sample, as well as annual
state-level economic variables, such as GDP. The differences among both the home
characteristic and local economic variables suggest that local fixed effects will be an
important factor in our model specifications.
We consider all homes in each state, conditional on the data being representative of
a state’s housing market. This is not the case for every state, as some do not have MLS
4Data provided by Zillow through the Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset (ZTRAX).
More information on accessing the data can be found at http://www.zillow.com/ztrax. The results
and opinions are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of Zillow Group.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transaction Prices ($)
House Price 330,342 364,989 10,838 9,999,181 38,145,054
log(House Price) 12.35 0.86 9.29 16.12 38,145,054
Price per Sq. Foot 180 179 1.24 23,088 38,145,054
log(Price per Sq. Foot) 4.90 0.80 0.21 10.05 38,145,054
Property Characteristics
Bedrooms 3.1 0.9 1.0 7.0 38,145,054
Bathrooms 2.1 0.8 0.25 7.0 38,145,054
Sq. Feet 1,948 1,065 420 10,228 38,145,054
log(Sq. Feet) 7.6 0.4 6.0 9.2 38,145,054
Year Built 1976 29 0.00 2018 38,145,054
State Characteristics
GDP (Millions $) 787,941 706,135 36,281 2,968,117 38,145,054
Population 15,535,151 12,272,350 567,136 39,557,045 38,145,054
Land (Acres) 77,264 50,066 61 261,797 38,145,054
Density 2.83 6.04 0.19 114.41 38,145,054
log(GDP) 13.18 0.92 10.50 14.90 38,145,054
log(Population) 16.21 0.89 13.25 17.49 38,145,054
log(Land) 10.96 0.96 4.12 12.48 38,145,054
Treatment Indicators
Recreational Vote 0.07 0.25 0 1 38,145,054
Recreational Possession 0.06 0.25 0 1 38,145,054
Dispensary Date 0.04 0.20 0 1 38,145,054
First Dispensary 0.04 0.20 0 1 38,145,054
Medical 0.45 0.50 0 1 38,145,054
Housing variables are at the individual property transaction level ist, where i is a single
property in state s. t reflects the date of transaction. The Price and Price per Sq. Foot
variables represent unique transaction prices and are deflated using the 2018 Consumer
Price Survey. The home characteristics Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Sq. Feet, and Year Built
are unique to a given property but not necessarily unique to the dataset if a given property
was sold more than once during the sample period. State characteristic variables are yearly
at the state level s. GDP is the gross domestic product in a given year, Population is
the state’s total population, Land is the total land area of state s in acres, and Density
is Population divided by Land which represents how concentrated a state’s population is
geographically. Treatment indicators are those indicators described in Section 3.3.2.
public reporting requirements across all counties. For example, North Dakota has only
one county which consistently reports transactions to the state’s MLS, so we exclude
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it from our sample. Additionally, since this research is interested in the spillover effect
of marijuana legalization of the housing market, we only consider homes which Zillow
documents as residential properties. The richness of the data means that some states
report business, government, and other non-residential properties. We exclude these
observations.
The data is also filtered for observations that are likely non-market transactions. All
included observations are categorized as a deed transfer, which signifies the exchange
of a property’s title from one party to another. Despite this, there are observations
where a non-market transfer occurs between, for example, family members in the case
of inheritance. These types of observations are often indicated as such, but in order
to further exclude cases where reporting standards differ, we also filter for transac-
tions which have a listed sales price below $10,000 and above $10,000,000. Doing so
substantially reduces the sample size, but it is unlikely that homes below that price
are actual market transactions given the price distribution. Additionally, states that
have fewer than 100,000 transaction across the sample period are excluded in order to
reinforce that a state’s housing market sample is properly represented. We provide a
more comprehensive examination of our data cleaning process for the Zillow data in
Appendix.
3.3.2 Marijuana Laws
In addition to the housing and dispensary data, we used the legalization dates as
determined by each state to identify our treatment conditions. As mentioned in the
introduction, there are three possible legal states that marijuana can be classified as:
legal to use recreationally, legal to use medicinally, and illegal. We used successful laws
and ballot measures to indicate the relative legality of marijuana in each state. The
information in this data is presented in Table 3.2. The second column reflects the date
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that a given state votes for and passes recreational legalization. The third column is
the “effective date” for recreational legalization when either the result of a popular
vote is approved or a law goes into effect. This is the date when it is no longer illegal
to possess or grow marijuana for recreational purposes.
It is not until the date in Column (4) that there is a way to legally purchase
recreational marijuana. An important distinction to note is the difference between the
“Dispensary Date” and “First Dispensary” columns. In some cases, the ballot question
outlines a specific date on which dispensaries are allowed to open. This is not always
the case, however, as some states leave the decision when to open dispensaries up to
local municipalities. This distinction is why Dispensary Date and First Dispensary
are considered two separate treatments. Some states, such as California and Colorado,
specify the Dispensary Date in their ballot questions, and as a result have dispensaries
open on that date. In that case, the Dispensary Date and First Dispensary column
dates are identical. Other states such as Massachusetts and Maine have large time gaps
between the two dates due to local governing bodies having discretion over dispensary
permit approvals. The preferred treatment and what is presented in our primary models
is the Dispensary Date. We provide separate estimates for both variables, and consider
the First Dispensary treatment as a robustness check.
We use a similar logic for cases of medical marijuana legalization. This process
is significantly more complicated, however, as the regulations enacted by each state
vary widely. A state may vote via a ballot measure or through the state legislature
to legalize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, but the process following that
approval has many additional steps. Similar to the recreational case, the law becomes
effective as soon as it is passed, but the possession of marijuana is not necessarily
legal due to the method through which the state distributes licenses. California, which
was one of the first states to enact medical marijuana legalization, distributed medical
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Table 3.2: Marijuana Legalization Laws
State Vote Possession Dispensary Date First Dispensary Medical
Alaska Nov 4, 2014 Feb 24, 2015 Feb 24, 2015 Oct 31, 2016 Mar 4, 1999
Arizona Nov 2, 2010
Arkansas Nov 9, 2016
California Nov 8, 2016 Nov 9, 2016 Jan 1, 2018 Jan 1, 2018 Nov 6, 1996
Colorado Nov 6, 2012 Dec 6, 2012 Jan 1, 2014 Jan 1, 2014 Jun 1, 2001
Connecticut May 31, 2012
Delaware Jul 1, 2011
Florida Jan 3, 2017
Hawaii Jun 14, 2000
Illinois Jun 25, 2019 Jan 1, 2020 Jan 1, 2020 Jan 1, 2020 Jan 1, 2014
Louisiana 1978
Maine Nov 8, 2016 Jan 30, 2017 May 2, 2018 Spring 2020 (Expected) Dec 22, 1999
Maryland Jun 1, 2014
Massachusetts Nov 8, 2016 Dec 15, 2016 Jul 1, 2018 Nov 20, 2018 Jan 1, 2013
Michigan Nov 6, 2018 Dec 6, 2018 Dec 1, 2019 Dec. 1, 2019 Dec 4, 2008
Minnesota May 30, 2014
Missouri Dec 6, 2018
Montana Nov 2, 2004
Nevada Nov 8, 2016 Jan 1, 2017 Jan 1, 2017 Jul 1, 2017 Oct 1, 2001
New Hampshire Jul 23, 2013
New Jersey Jul 1, 2010
New Mexico Jul 1, 2007
New York Jul 5, 2014
North Dakota Apr 18, 2017
Ohio Sep 8, 2016
Oklahoma Jul 26, 2018
Oregon Nov 4, 2014 Jul 1, 2015 Oct 1, 2015 Oct 1, 2015 Dec 3, 1998
Pennsylvania May 17, 2016
Rhode Island Jan 3, 2006
Utah Dec 1, 2018
Vermont Jan 22, 2018 Jul 1, 2018 Jul 1, 2004
Washington Nov 6, 2012 Dec 6, 2012 Jul 8, 2014 Jul 8, 2014 Nov 3, 1998
Washington DC Nov 4, 2014 Feb 26, 2015 Jun 20, 2010
West Virginia Jul 1, 2018
Total 12 12 10 10 34
Note: Vermont and Washington D.C. have passed laws allowing for the possession and cultivation of recreational mar-
ijuana, but have yet to allow for sales at retail locations as of this writing in February 2020. The data was derived from
legislative and ballot acts, which are compiled nationally at the Marijuana Policy Project – https://www.mpp.org/
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license cards similar to a driver’s license for those eligible for marijuana possession.
Additionally, there are complications with prescriptions that vary by state which add
a layer of complexity to identifying the timing of our effective date. It is also not
always clear whether dispensaries that can sell medical marijuana to users with a valid
prescription have opened, or if there is some other distribution mechanism that the
state has adopted. As a result, we use a similar logic to the recreational case and
consider the effective medical marijuana legalization date to be the date that a ballot
measure is ratified or a state legislative measure is signed by the governor.
3.3.3 Dispensary Data
For our spatial analysis we use data from the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the
Colorado Department of Revenue and the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis
Board, which detail every dispensary location in the two states since their legaliza-
tion of recreational marijuana. These data include the spatial coordinates of a given
dispensary and the year it opened. Our estimation focuses on the opening of new dis-
pensaries, so the data begins in 2014 when the first strictly recreational dispensaries
opened in Colorado and Washington. It is worth noting however that there existed dis-
pensaries in both states prior to recreational legalization due to the previous passage of
medical legalization. Those dispensaries are taken as given and exist at the start of the
data. The spatial identification strategy depends on the opening of new dispensaries,
so whether a dispensary was an already-existing medical dispensary should have no
bearing on the validity of the estimation. We combine the dispensary data with the
Zillow housing data to estimate the effect of new dispensaries opening on the housing




Our empirical strategy involves three primary specifications. First is a linear model,
which we test with varying fixed effect levels to establish a baseline relationship between
marijuana legalization (both MML and RML) and home prices. We estimate the
following:
(3.1)log(Priceijst) = α1Recreational Votest + α2Recreational Possessionst
+ α3Dispensary Datest + α4Medicalst + βX
′
ijst + δj + ρq + εijst
Since the Zillow housing data is at the transaction level, our primary dependent vari-
able Priceist is the price of home i in county/city/ZIP j and state s at time t. In this sim-
ple model the variables of interest are Recreational Votest, Recreational Possessionst,
Dispensary Datest, and Medicalst, which are all binary variables indicating whether
state s has adopted RML (for Recreational Vote, Recreational Possession, and Dis-
pensary Dates) or MML (for Medical) at time t. Recreational Votest = 1 if the state
has approved RML by ballot vote or a legislative statute by the transaction date,
Recreational Possessionst = 1 if the RML law has gone into effect and it is legal to
possess marijuana, Dispensary Datest = 1 if dispensaries can apply for permits to sell
recreational marijuana, and Medicalst = 1 if MML has been approved by state voters
or legislators. In addition to these indicators, X ′ijst is a vector of housing characteristics
and local economic measures including the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, the age of
the home, state GDP, state population, and state land area. Finally we include location
and time fixed effects, δj and ρq, respectively. We use year-quarter fixed effects for ρq,
but the legalization dummies are defined by the exact date of RML voting, possession,
and dispensary openings. This makes our models traditional hedonic estimations.
The second model employed is an unconditional quantile regression (UQR), as spec-
ified by Firpo et al. (2009) (FFL). Table 3.1 demonstrates the large amount of variation
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across the data, especially with regard to our outcome variable of choice, home price.
The observed prices and house characteristics exhibit significant heterogeneity, which
makes a UQR an attractive estimation strategy. As we demonstrated in Figure 3.1,
3.2, and 3.3, response to the housing recovery varied widely between RML states and
non-RML states. Extending this idea to the distribution of prices, a UQR model ac-
counts for systematic differences across states that may influence their decision to pass
legalization measures. The UQR model is evaluated on the distribution of independent
variables marginally. Because of this, the model does not depend on the covariates
conditioned on as in a traditional conditional model.
The UQR model evaluates the impact of RML and MML on house prices across the
price distribution using a recentered influence function (RIF) (Hampel et al. (2005)).
Although the RIF can be applied to any distributional statistic, FFL use it to estimate
quantiles along the distribution. The marginal effect of any quantile on the home price
can be represented by:
(3.2)
E[RIF(Priceijst; qτ )|RML,MML, X, δ, ρ] = α1Recreational Votest
+ α2Recreational Possessionst + α3Dispensary Datest
+ α4Medicalst + βX
′
ijst + δj + ρq + εijst
Model 3.2 is the same equation as in Model 3.1, with the only difference being
the estimation of the RIF. qτ in the RIF reflects each quantile being estimated. In
our case we will derive estimates for each decile along the price distribution (i.e. qτ =
(0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9)). By estimating each decile, the RIF allows us to interpret the effect of
RML across the distribution which may provide additional insight into the mechanisms
behind legalization’s impact on the housing market.
Like the fixed effects Model 3.1, the UQR estimates the difference in home prices
along the distribution across states. It could be the case that there are differences
within states that legalized marijuana use as well. To test this we use data from the
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Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado Department of Revenue, the state
agency in Colorado tasked with regulating the sale of marijuana, and the Washington
State Liquor and Cannabis Board. The agencies’ data provide the location of marijuana
dispensaries opened in the states between 2014-2018. By combining this data with the
Zillow housing data, we are able to estimate the effect of a dispensary opening on
neighborhood home values.
A clear source of endogeneity in a standard difference-in-differences (DiD) approach
is that the location of a dispensary is not random; a firm chooses what it believes to
be the most profitable location for its dispensary and finds suitable properties to rent
or purchase. The firm may rent property in a business district or near transit, which
could bias the housing market in the immediate area upward. On the other hand if
these are new or inexperienced businesses that have capital constraints, they might
locate where property is relatively inexpensive. This would have the opposite effect,
as homes in less dense areas are generally on the lower tail of the price distribution.
To account for the endogeneity concern, we use a DiD approach developed in
Dronyk-Trosper (2017). The authors use the local government’s construction of public
service facilities, such as fire departments and police stations, to identify changes in
the local housing market. Control homes are those which maintain their distance from
the closest facility throughout the sample period. Treatment homes are those which –
at period t0 – have the same distance as the control group but at some future period
ts, where s > 0, a new facility is constructed that reduces the distance to the nearest
option. We modify this approach by substituting the public facilities for marijuana
dispensaries. The spatial DiD model is represented by:
log(Pricei) = β1Treatmenti + β2Statei + β3(Treatmenti × Statei) + γXi + εi (3.3)
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with Treatmenti is an indicator variable which reflects whether a home is in our
treatment group – whether a new dispensary has opened closer to home i since period
t0. Statei is a dummy for whether a home sale occurred before or after the construction
of a new closer dispensary, and Xi is a vector of home characteristic controls. β3 is
our variable of interest, which represents the change in home values for treated units
following the opening of a new dispensary. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the buffer zones
around marijuana dispensaries in the Denver metropolitan area and the homes that
fall within the buffer zone. For the purpose of Model 3.3, only a subset of the homes
that appear in Figure 3.4 will be included in our treatment group.
Figure 3.4: Illustration of Spatial Difference in Difference Model in Denver, Colorado
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Housing Prices Following Statewide Marijuana Legalization
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 estimate the effect of recreational marijuana legalization on housing
prices using a simple linear model and a fixed effects model, respectively. In these tables
and in the rest of the main specifications, the dependent variable is the logged value of
home prices. Each column in the two tables includes a single treatment variable with
the exception of Column (5), which includes three treatment variables. The treatment
variable indicating the date recreational marijuana possession is legalized is excluded in
Column (5) because, as indicated in Table 3.2, the gap between the vote and possession
dates are typically no longer than a month. If this gap is longer than a month, then
the possession date is typically very close to the first legal sales date. We estimate
the coefficient for possession separately in Column (2) of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, and as
expected its point estimate falls between the vote and sales points estimates.
In Table 3.3, as in the rest of the tables that follow, each estimation includes
variables which control for house characteristics and state economic indicators. Table
3.3 includes city-level clustered standard errors to account for potential correlations
of error terms, but does not include any fixed effects indicators. In this simple linear
model the estimated coefficients of interest are large and significant, with each point
estimate reflecting greater than a eighteen percent appreciation in home prices for the
RML variables of interest. Table 3.4 includes city and year-quarter fixed effects for the
same five estimations as Table 3.3. This table represents the primary linear cross-state
results. Similar to the previous table, we find large and positive estimates for the three
RML treatment indicators, again exceeding ten percent when considered individually.
A noteworthy difference between the fixed effects and OLS models is the magnitude of
the coefficients. Including fixed effects greatly reduced the estimated effect, which is
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to be expected considering the data is a national sample which features large amounts
of heterogeneity in housing and economic characteristics.
Table 3.3: Effect of Marijuana Legalization on House Price per Sq. Foot (OLS)
log (House Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medical 0.414*** 0.409***
(0.035) (0.034)




Dispensary Date 0.152*** -0.024
(0.035) (0.029)
R-squared 0.322 0.281 0.281 0.280 0.323
Observations 38,145,054
Note: (i) The Possession dummy is excluded in the main column (5) since the time
gap between Recreational Vote and Possession or Possession and the Dispensary Date
are typically quite small. (ii) Both house characteristics – which includes bedrooms,
bathrooms, the year built – and state characteristics such as state per capita GDP
and density are controlled for in each model. (iii) City level clustered standard errors
in parenthesis to take into account potential correlation in the error terms. (iv) As a
robustness check we use house price per square foot as the dependent variable, which
can be seen in Table 3.A1 in Appendix B. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
The model is designed to identify the effect of RML specifically, but we include the
medical coefficient in order to address the potential endogeneity issue of states voting
in favor of recreational legalization. Policy treatment represents a selection issue as
voters choose whether to vote in favor of marijuana legalization. As seen in Table 3.2,
however, there are a large number of states which have legalized medical marijuana
but only ten which have legalized recreational marijuana. Due to the limitations of
the Zillow housing data discussed in Section 3.3.1, the only states which are in the
RML treatment group are California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington. RML treatment states make up less than a quarter of the MML states
as a result. Every state that has enacted RML has enacted MML, but the inverse is
not true. By including the medical treatment in our primary model specification, we
cannot guarantee the consistency of the medical coefficient but we should recover the
marginal effect for the two RML treatment variables.
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Column (5) of Table 3.4 demonstrates that once we include city and year-quarter
fixed effects into our primary linear model, both Recreational Vote and Dispensaries
Date’s coefficients retain large, positive, and significant point estimates. The larger
effect happens at the Dispensary Date, when the first dispensary could open. This es-
timate reflects an eleven percent appreciation in home prices. As explained in Section
3.3.2, this is not necessarily the date that the first dispensary opens since each munic-
ipality in a given treatment state has different permitting rules for new businesses. As
a robustness check, we use the opening date of the first dispensary in a state as the
dispensary treatment and find qualitatively similar results. The estimated coefficient
for the Recreational Vote treatment meanwhile reflects 5.4 percent price appreciation.
Taken together, the two linear models support the hypothesis that RML induces large
positive effects in the housing market.
Table 3.4: Effect of Marijuana Legalization on Home Price (Fixed Effects)
log (Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medical 0.039** 0.061***
(0.019) (0.020)




Dispensary Date 0.138*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.010)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.611
Observations 38,144,444
Note: All models include city and year-quarter fixed effects. Beside our typical
house characteristic controls (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, age), we also include
local economic indicators at the state level. These include per capita GDP and
population density. City level clustered standard errors are in parentheses to
account for potential correlation in the error terms. As a robustness check we use
house price per square foot as the dependent variable, which can be seen in Table
3.A1 in Appendix B. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
To further test the state-level effect of marijuana legalization on housing prices,
we estimate an unconditional quantile regression (UQR) as specified by Firpo et al.
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(2009). A UQR has three principle advantages over a traditional linear model despite
the fact that it simply recovers the marginal effect of the treatment indicators. First,
it is less sensitive to extreme values in the dependent variable. This is unlikely to be an
issue in the data used for this paper as the number of observations is substantial, but it
is nonetheless a strength of the model. Second, a UQR model accounts for differences
across states that could affect the likelihood of a given state passing a marijuana
legalization bill, which is a significant concern. Finally it marginalizes the treatment
effect across the price distribution, which provides a more complete understanding of
the impact of RML on the housing market.
With those advantages in mind, Figure 3.5 and 3.6 plot the UQR coefficients for
each decile along the distribution. For a more precise view of the estimated coefficients,
Appendix Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4 in Appendix display the point estimates. Again we
have estimated two model specifications, one with the Dispensary Date treatment and
one with First Dispensary due to the close time proximity of those two variables. A
pattern emerges in both cases: there appears to be some significant effect in the Medical
Vote or Recreational Vote treatments and a significant, positive, and increasing effect
across the Dispensary Date/First Dispensary distributions. The Recreational Vote
treatment show some significant appreciation in the top four deciles, but as in the
linear models the Medical coefficients should be interpreted conservatively.
The positive effect in the upper deciles for the two Vote treatments range between
a three and twelve percent increase in home price. The concentration, especially in
Qτ = .80, .90 could point to the level of liquidity available to those purchasing the
most expensive properties. For example, if those wealthy buyers have greater access
to credit than buyers lower in the distribution, then their demand for marijuana and
in turn housing in RML or MML states could shift immediately upon the success of a
ballot measure. This interpretation would be consistent with the economic development
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Figure 3.5: Unconditional Quantile Regression (Dispensary Date)
108
Figure 3.6: Unconditional Quantile Regression (First Dispensary)
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hypothesis presented in Section 3.2.3; demand for housing is responsive to employment
gains, which itself is a natural byproduct of new business creation, and potential in-
migration. The results support the those from the linear fixed effects model estimated
in Table 3.4, with the top two deciles dominating the average effect,
The Dispensary Date and First Dispensary treatments differ from the two Vote
treatments in that they have large, positive, and significant effects across the price
per square foot distribution. These values range from approximately seven percent
to nineteen percent, with the point estimates increasing in magnitude until beginning
to decrease at the 7th decile. It should be noted that the values in the 8th and
9th deciles have very large confidence intervals and so the point estimates may be
overstating the effect. Regardless of the estimated confidence intervals, we can say
with some certainty that the two dispensary treatment dates reflect a shift in housing
demand in RML and MML states. This large effect again supports the hypothesis
that the economic development effect drives the change in the housing market. Once
recreational marijuana becomes available to buy easily at a dispensary and tax revenue
is generated, there is significant home price appreciation.
3.5.2 Spatial Model
To further test whether it is open dispensaries that are driving the increased demand
for housing, we estimate the results from a spatial model which identifies the effect
of new dispensaries on the value of nearby homes. The model, which is described in
Section 3.4 and follows the empirical strategy developed in Dronyk-Trosper (2017),
estimates the within-state effect, as opposed to the cross-state effect of the linear and
UQR models presented in the previous section. The various treated groups in this
model represent homes which have already been “exposed” to a dispensary by having
a dispensary open within a two-mile radius of the property. They are then considered
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics by Spatial Difference-in-Difference Treatment
Inside 0.5 Miles Between 0.5 and 1 Mile Between 1 and 2 Miles Outside 2 Miles
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
House Price ($) 413,997 373,542 364,451 338,805 378,964 355,227 368,097 296,083
Price per Sq. Foot ($) 255 193 214 149 198 132 186 128
Sq. Feet 1,711 873 1,723 846 1,941 963 2,046 964
Bedrooms 2.9 0.9 3.0 0.9 3.1 0.9 3.1 0.9
Bathrooms 2.0 0.9 2.1 0.8 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.9
Age of House at Sale (Years) 41.5 31.3 43.3 28.9 33.3 24.7 27.1 22.8
Observations 382,937 134,337 150,123 218,436
The sample for the spatial difference-in-differences (SDD) model includes all home transactions in Colorado and Washington from
2014-2018. Each grouping represents the distance a home is from a dispensary, so for example homes in the first group are less than a
half mile away from the nearest dispensary.
treated when a second dispensary opens geographically closer at a later date. Figure
3.4 demonstrates this idea graphically.
In order for this empirical strategy to be valid, homes in the treatment groups must
not differ from each other in price and house characteristics. Table 3.5 presents the
mean and standard deviation values for the four groups. The group “Inside 0.5 Miles”
includes all homes sold which were within a half mile of a dispensary at any point
in the sample period of 2014-2018 in Colorado and Washington; “Between 0.5 and 1
Mile” includes homes sold which were between a half and one mile of a dispensary at
any point in the sample period; “Between 1 and 2 Miles” contains homes sold which
were between one and two miles of a dispensary at any point in the sample period;
and the “Outside 2 Miles” group includes homes which are outside a two-mile radius
of any dispensary.
Table 3.6 presents the results for the spatial difference-in-differences models. Like
the linear and UQR estimates in the previous section, each of the models have the
logged value of price as the dependent variable. Column (1) is a simple fixed effects
model, where the point estimates for 1/2 Mile Zone, 1 Mile Zone, and 2 Mile Zone
reflect the premium for homes within a two mile radius of a dispensary in Colorado
and Washington during our sample period. This model in this column has no causal
mechanism and simply estimates the mean difference between homes near (i.e. within
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two miles) of a dispensary and those outside that bound. Homes within 0.5 miles have
a slight premium of 4.5 percent, but homes between 0.5 miles and one mile and homes
between one and two miles have a slight discount.
Table 3.6: Spatial Difference-in-Differences
log (Price)
(1) (2) (3)
1/2 Mile Zone 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.082***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 Mile Zone -0.028*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
2 Mile Zone -0.034***
(0.002)
Control Group Outside 2 Miles Within 2 Miles Within 1 Mile
Observations 885,833 650,437 565,923
R-squared 0.406 0.425 0.431
The sample includes transactions in the period between 2014 and 2018 in
Colorado and Washington. Logged county level data such as county number of
employees, wage, and the county employment ratio (county employees/state
total employees), as well as home characteristics including the number of
bedrooms, the square value of bedrooms, the age of the home, the number of
bathrooms, and the square footage of the home, are used in the regression to
control for differences across the states. Column 1 is an OLS model where
treatment homes are homes that fall within 2 miles or closer of a dispensary
and control homes are home that are not within 2 miles of a dispensary.
Column 2 is the spatial difference in difference model where the control group
becomes all homes that fall within 2 miles of a dispensary and the treatment
group are homes that start off within 2 miles of a location and move within
.5 or 1 mile of a dispensary. Column 3 is the same but now control are
home starting off 1 mile and moving within .5 miles of a dispensary. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
The primary spatial model specifications appear in Columns (2) and (3) of Table
3.6. Both columns follow the identification strategy in Dronyk-Trosper (2017), and
so can be interpreted as the causal effect of a marijuana dispensary opening on the
local housing market. Column (2) uses homes within two miles of a dispensary as the
control group. The two treatment variables – 1/2 Mile Zone and 1 Mile Zone – are
indicators for homes which previously were within two miles of a dispensary and were
subsequently sold after a new dispensary opens. The sold homes are newly situated
within a half mile or between a half mile and a mile of a dispensary, respectively. The
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coefficients for 1/2 Mile Zone and 1 Mile Zone represent the premium for these homes.
Both treatment zones experience an appreciation in price after the construction of a
new dispensary. The 1 Mile Zone homes increase in value by slightly under one percent
and the 1/2 Mile Zone homes increase by slightly over seven percent. Column (3) is
the same specification, except now the only treated homes are those within a half mile
of a new dispensary. The homes in 1 Mile Zone that were previously considered part of
our treatment group in Column (2) are now included in the control group. Again the
estimated coefficient for the half mile group is significant and positive with an eight
percent appreciation. In order to guarantee that the results are not being driven by
one of the two state’s effect dominating the other, we separate the sample into tables
for Colorado and Washington as a robustness check. Appendix tables 3.A5 and 3.A6
appear in Appendix. The results are similar between the two states and between the
individual state estimates and the combined estimates, suggesting that this effect is
not due to one state’s influence.
Dronyk-Trosper (2017) find that the effect of municipal government service build-
ings, such as police stations and firehouses, increases the value of homes at a decreasing
rate. Those homes closest to the government buildings actually decrease in value, likely
as a response to the increased traffic and noise associated with those services. Our
results imply the opposite; when a dispensary opens nearby, homes closest to it appre-
ciate in price the most. This is consistent with our interpretation that new dispensaries
act as amenities in the local housing market. Since the spatial model is restricted to
Washington and Colorado – the first two states to legalize recreational marijuana – we
cannot guarantee that these results generalize to each subsequent state that legalizes.
However, together with the cross-state models presented in the previous section, it is
clear that recreational marijuana legalization has large positive effects on the housing




There are two primary robustness check categories we employ. First, we use the home
price per square foot as the dependent variable rather than home price. Geographic
heterogeneity in our sample suggests that simply using house price as the dependent
variable could bias the results since treatment homes are in high-price states. By using
house price per square foot as the dependent variable, we can ensure that this potential
source of bias is accounted for. Second, we include the First Dispensary treatment in
place of the Dispensary Date variable for the reasons outline in Section 3.3.2. If the
primary mechanism in our cross-state models is the economic development effect, then
it is possible that the impact is only felt once the first dispensaries open and a large
volume of marijuana sales take place, thereby generating tax revenue.
Appendix Table 3.A1 uses the log value of house price per square foot as the de-
pendent variable in the two linear cross-state models. In this table, Dispensary Date
is still the right-hand side treatment variable of choice. As in the price per square
foot results, the OLS model in the first five columns shows large positive results for all
four treatment variables, including the Medical Vote treatment. Again, these results
should be interpreted carefully as the Medical Vote treatment is likely absorbing a large
amount of the effect due to the lack of time fixed effects. That being said, the point
estimates are very similar to those presented in Table 3.3. The same can be said for
the fixed effects results in columns (6) through (10). The Recreational Vote variable is
still significant and positive, as is the Dispensary Date. The point estimates are large
and positive, as in the original specification.
Next, we check our results using First Dispensary as our treatment variable of
interest rather than Dispensary Date. For some states these dates are the same, so we
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would expect the results to be very similar. Appendix table 3.A2 presents the estimates,
and indeed that is what we find. The results are consistent with the Dispensary Date
results. Once again, there are positive effects for each of the two RML variables,
Recreational Vote and First Dispensary, just as in our primary results. The magnitude
of the First Dispensary estimates are similar to those for Dispensary Date presented
in Table 3.4. Appendix table 3.A2 also presents the original model specification with
various levels of controls. Excluding house characteristic and local economic variables
do no affect the magnitude or significance of the estimated models.
3.6 Conclusion
Uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of marijuana legalization, along with
marijuana’s status on the federal level as a Schedule 1 drug, have made the public
reluctant to support policies which liberalize its use and distribution. To help fill this
information gap, this research demonstrates that there is a large positive spillover effect
on the housing market following legalization. We further support these findings with
a spatial approach which shows that within states that legalize recreational marijuana
use, homes experience a positive valuation shock when a dispensary opens nearby. The
results are robust to a number of of specifications, including a different (but temporally
similar) date for the actual sale of marijuana at dispensaries. Taken together, the inter
and intra-state results suggest that preferences for public services – derived from a
new source of tax revenue – and dispensaries as a commercial amenity create largely
positive effects following the legalization of recreational marijuana.
The impact of legalization on the housing market is supported by two models. First,
a fixed effects model demonstrates a five percent appreciation in home prices follow-
ing the passage of RML and an eleven percent appreciation once sales of marijuana
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products begin. Extending this logic to an unconditional quantile regression approach,
we find positive effects across the home price distribution following the date that dis-
pensaries are allowed to open. Differences across the price distribution can likely be
thought of as heterogeneous preferences among different levels of wealth. The promise
of future funding to schools and other public infrastructure as a result of legalization
supports a long literature showing a positive relationship between home prices and
local economic development.
To approximate the effect of dispensaries we estimate a spatial model in Colorado
and Washington. The results again show price appreciations for homes as the distance
to the nearest dispensary decreases. This demonstrates that is it not simply the benefits
of increased tax revenue, but also the existence of the dispensaries themselves, that
is driving the price increases. The dispensaries act as commercial amenities that the
public puts a premium on being nearby.
Without the benefit of foresight, our research is not able to determine whether the
positive effect will persist. For example if immigration inflows are the primary cause
of our results, then we would expect that states would experience diminishing returns
to legalization. The first cohort of states which legalized recreational marijuana would
draw those that valued legalization most, and each successive state should not expect a
similar inflow. Additionally, more research on marijuana legalization is required to fill
in the remaining knowledge gaps. We do not estimate some of the other second-order
effects, such as the impact on policing and the outcomes for minority communities that
were previously convicted for marijuana possession at a disproportionate rate. Future
research would be well served to approach these questions, as it will better inform the
public and policy makers with respect to the reclassification of recreational drugs.
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Appendix: Data Cleaning Description
Zillow Housing Data
Considering the size and scope of the Zillow ZTRAX repository, it is necessary to
document the data cleaning process used for this research. However, in order to create
a dataset that is both national and representative, some adjustments were made to
the import process. In general, the effort follows Zillow’s own script which creates a
hedonic dataset.5 The end product results in a dataframe in which each row is a home
transaction and each column reflects home and transaction characteristics. The files
are initially imported state-by-state and then appended together to make a master file.
The process goes as follows. First, three tables are imported from the Assessment
repository: Main, Building, and BuildingAreas. These three tables combine to provide
house characteristics, as well as information about the type of property exchanged in
a given transaction. For example, the variable “PropertyLandUseStndCode” in the
Building table details whether a property is a single-family residence, used in industry,
is a farm, et cetera. We erred on the side of inclusivity when filtering for these variables
during import, as reporting standards across counties and states vary widely. The














10. Planned Unit Development
11. Residential Common Area
12. Seasonal, Cabin, Vacation Residence
13. Bungalow
14. Zero Lot Line




19. Inferred Single-Family Residential
Also, following the logic described by Zillow, we filter the “BuildingAreaStndCode”
from the BuildingAreas table in order to get as accurate a measure of total square
footage as possible. Again, different counties have different reporting standards as
to what is included in their square footage calculations, so to ensure consistency we
have included only those options which enumerate the buildings on the property, not
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the land itself. These two filters – for “PropertyLandUseStndCode” and “BuildingAr-
eaStndCode” – are the only two at this point in the process. Once this is complete,
the three assessment tables are merged to create a single assessment file with all the
necessary housing characteristic variables to be used in analysis.
The second set of data comes from the Transaction repository. Included are the
PropertyInfo and Main tables. All the information provided here reflects the transac-
tion itself, not any characteristics of the home. This includes variables like the price of
the transaction, the date of transfer, and the type of transfer. The only filtering that
occurs in this step is in regard to the variable “DataClassStndCode,” which details the
type of transaction occurring. Since the subject of study are property transactions,
only deed transfers and deed transfers with concurrent mortgages are included. This
excludes other types of transactions, including foreclosures and inter-family transfers
as in the case of inheritances. These two tables are appended together to make a single
transaction file. Finally, the transaction and assessment files are combined to make a
single master file for a given state. The states files are then appended together to make
a national-level dataset which is then used for analysis.
The master file is filtered to exclude extreme observations, as well as define the
period of study. To ensure that results are not being driven but incorrect or im-
plausible observations, we drop transactions which had sales prices below $10,000 and
above $10,000,000, similar to Cheng et al. (2018). On the lower end it is unlikely that
transactions with prices below $10,000 occurred on the market, and may have slipped
through the “DataClassStndCode” filter. Prices above $10,000,000 are extraordinary
and in some cases are likely the result of data entry errors. Similarly, house char-
acteristics are filtered to exclude observations that are in the top thousandth or top
ten-thousandth percentile. Doing so, for example, eliminated an observation with over
1000 bedrooms. This process removed a large number of observations in states which
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do not require counties to report the home characteristics, leaving small states like
Maine with just 11,000 transaction observations. To guarantee a representative sam-
ple, we then dropped states which did not have at least 100,000 observations. That
is an arbitrary standard, but by doing so we can more confidently argue that each
states’ market is properly represented. Finally, prices were adjusted to reflect 2018
prices using the Federal Reserve’s Consumer Price Index.
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Appendix: Additional Model Specifications
Table 3.A1: Effect of Recreational Marijuana Legalization on House Price per Sq. Foot
log (Price per Sq. Foot)
OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Medical 0.466*** 0.461*** 0.046** 0.069***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021)
Recreational Vote 0.187*** 0.088*** 0.108*** 0.055***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014)
Recreational Possession 0.193*** 0.109***
(0.031) (0.015)
Dispensary Date 0.169*** 0.001 0.141*** 0.116***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.015) (0.011)
Bedrooms -0.434*** -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.459*** -0.433*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Bedrooms2 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bathrooms 0.188*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.187*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Per Capita 0.356*** 0.828*** 0.826*** 0.870*** 0.314*** 1.323*** 1.273*** 1.273*** 1.302*** 1.252***
(0.053) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.111)
Density 0.004*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.005*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
City FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.161 0.099 0.099 0.098 0.162 0.528 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.530
Observations 38,145,054 38,145,054 38,145,054 38,145,054 38,145,054 38,144,444 38,144,444 38,144,444 38,144,444 38,144,444
Note: (i) The dependent variable is the log of house price per square foot while the first half columns are OLS results and the latter half are FE results.
(ii) Possession dummy is excluded in our main columns (5) and (10) since the time gap between vote and possession, or sale and possession are too small
to capture significantly valuable variations. (iii) City level clustered standard errors in parenthesis to take into account the correlations of error terms.
∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
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Table 3.A2: Effect of Recreational Marijuana Legalization on House Price (Ro-
bustness)
log (Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medical 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.062***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Recreational Vote 0.168*** 0.154*** 0.161*** 0.146*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Dispensary Date 0.063*** 0.074***
(0.013) (0.013)
First Dispensary 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.120***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Bedrooms 0.023 0.023 0.035*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Bedrooms2 -0.005** -0.005** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bathrooms 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.135***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(Sq. Feet) 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.645***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 0.000* 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




R-squared 0.427 0.601 0.428 0.601 0.611
Observations 38,144,444
Note: (i) Various levels of controls are used to ensure that the models are not
misspecified. (ii) City level clustered standard errors in parenthesis to take
into account the correlations of error terms. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05,
∗ : p < 0.1
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Table 3.A3: Heterogeneous Effect of Marijuana Legalization on House Price across Qτ
Log(Price per Sq. Foot)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Recreational Vote -0.016 -0.015 0.014 0.021 0.031** 0.046*** 0.071*** 0.104*** 0.123***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
Dispensary Date 0.074*** 0.099*** 0.121*** 0.152*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.151*** 0.108*** 0.073**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036)
Medical 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.061** 0.057** 0.053** 0.041*
(0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
R-squared 0.060 0.123 0.179 0.218 0.243 0.254 0.247 0.220 0.163
Number of Cities 10,640
Observations 38,145,054
Note: (i) Possession dummy is excluded since the time gap between vote and possession, or sale and possession are quite
small. (ii) House characteristics such as the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, year built and state characteristics such
as state GDP, population, land area, and density are controlled in the regressions. (iii) City level clustered standard
errors in parenthesis to take into account the correlations of error terms. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
Table 3.A4: Heterogeneous Effect of Marijuana Legalization on House Price across Qτ
Log(Price per Sq. Foot)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Recreational Vote -0.015 -0.014 0.015 0.022 0.030** 0.043*** 0.068*** 0.100*** 0.119***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
First Dispensary 0.076*** 0.104*** 0.126*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 0.195*** 0.165*** 0.120*** 0.084**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.036)
Medical 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.058** 0.054** 0.042*
(0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
R-squared 0.060 0.123 0.179 0.218 0.243 0.254 0.247 0.220 0.164
Number of Cities 10,640
Observations 38,145,054
Note: (i) First Dispensary is used in place of Dispensary Date for the purpose of a robustness check. (ii) The Possession
dummy is excluded since the time gap between Recreational Vote and Recreational Possession, or First Dispensary
and Recreational Possession are quite small. (iii) House characteristics such as the number of bedrooms, bathrooms,
year built and state characteristics such as state per capita GDP, and density are controlled in the regressions. (iv)
City level clustered standard errors in parenthesis to take into account the correlations of error terms. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01,
∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
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Table 3.A5: Spatial Difference-in-Differences: Colorado Subsample
log (Price)
(1) (2) (3)
1/2 Mile Zone 0.059*** 0.114*** 0.123***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1 Mile Zone -0.036*** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.003)
2 Mile Zone -0.067***
(0.003)
Control Group Outside 2 Miles Within 2 Miles Within 1 Mile
Observations 447,501 256,699 218,605
R-squared 0.411 0.414 0.413
The results in this table are from the same model specification as in the
Spatial Difference-in-Differences Table 6, but limited to the observations in
the Colorado subsample. House characteristics and county-level economic
data are used as controls with robust standard errors. ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01,
∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
Table 3.A6: Spatial Difference-in-Differences: Washington Subsample
log (Price)
(1) (2) (3)
1/2 Mile Zone 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 Mile Zone -0.015*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002)
2 Mile Zone -0.013***
(0.003)
Control Group Outside 2 Miles Within 2 Miles Within 1 Mile
Observations 438,332 393,738 347,318
R-squared 0.491 0.510 0.519
The results in this table are from the same model specification as in
the Spatial Difference-in-Differences Table 6, but limited to the observa-
tions in the Washington subsample. House characteristics and county-
level economic data are used as controls with robust standard errors.
∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1
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